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ABSTRACT
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This thesis provides a detailed analysis of the historical narrative contained in the 'Tarih'
history textbooks used in the secondary schools of the Turkish Republic in the 1930s. It
argues that the shape of this narrative was determined by pragmatic, ideological and
historiographical  factors.  Pragmatically,  it  was  intended  to  support  the  program  of
nation-building and secularizing/westernizing reform embarked on by the Turkish state
in  the  1920s  and  1930s.  Ideologically,  it  reflected  the  nationalist,  positivist  and
secularist outlook of the early republican Kemalist elite. In historiographical terms, it
was influenced by a variety of narratives regarding the history of the Turkish nation that
had been developed in the final decades of the Ottoman Empire. The thesis is divided
into three chapters.  The first chapter provides an account of the Turkish state's twin
programs of nation-building and westernizing/secularizing reform throughout the 1920s,
and a discussion of the ideological background to these programs. The second chapter
presents  a  brief  account  of  the  writing  of  the  new national  history,  and places  this
history in its historiographical context.  The third chapter contains an analysis of the
history of the Turkish nation as presented in the history textbooks. Separate sections in
this chapter focus on the textbook depiction of the origins and character of the Turkish
nation, of the Turkish nation's supposed role in spreading civilization throughout the
world, of the history of the Turks of Central Asia and of Islam, and of the history of the
Ottoman Empire.
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ÖZET
TÜRK MİLLİYETÇİLİĞİNİN VE BATI MEDENİYETİNİN ARASINDA: 
1930'LARDA KEMALIST TARIH DERS KİTAPLARI
PATRICK CHRISTIAN HELMUT SCHILLING
Tarih Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Ağostos 2016
Tez Danışmanı: Yrd. Doç. Dr. Yusuf Hakan Erdem
Anahtar Kelimeler: Tarih Yazımı, Tarih Ders Kitapları, Erken Cumhuriyet Dönemi,
Kemalizm, Türk Milliyetçiliği 
Bu tez 1930’lu yılların Türkiye’sinde basılan 'Tarih' adlı lise ders kitaplarında yer alan
tarihsel anlatının ayrıntılı bir analizini içerir. Çalışmanın argümanı, ders kitaplarında yer
alan anlatının aldığı biçimde hem ideolojik ve pragmatik etkenlerin hem de mevcut tarih
yazımsal  yaklaşımların  belirleyici  olduğudur.  Pragmatik  etkenler,  Türkiye  devletinin
1920  ve  1930’lu  yıllardaki  ulus  inşası  ve  sekülerleşme/batılılaşma  reformlarının
desteklenmek  istenmesinde  yatmaktadır.  İdeolojik  etkenler  ise  erken  cumhuriyet
dönemindeki  Kemalist  elitlerin  milliyetçi,  pozitivist  ve  seküler  dünya  görüşünü
yansıtmaktadır.  Ders  kitaplarındaki  tarihsel  anlatı  aynı  zamanda  Osmanlı
İmparatorluğu'nun son yıllarında ortaya çıkan farklı tarih yazım yaklaşımlarının etkisini
yansıtmaktadır. Tez üç ana bölüme ayrılmıştır. Birinci bölüm Türkiye devletinde 1920’li
yıllarda yapılan ulus inşası ve batılılaşma/sekülerleşme reformlarını ve bu reformların
ideolojik arka planını konu etmektedir. İkinci bölüm, yeni ulusal tarih yazımının ortaya
çıkışı ve yerleştiği genel tarih yazımı çerçevesini konu etmektedir. Üçüncü bölüm ise
incelenen ders kitaplarında yer verilen tarih anlatısının analizini içermektedir.  Analiz
ders  kitaplarındaki  tarih  anlatısının  şu  parçalarına  odaklanmıştır:  Türk  ulusunun
karakteri,  medeniyetin  dünyaya  yayılışında  Türk ulusunun varsayılan  rolü,  İslam ve
Orta Asya Türkleri'nin tarihi, ve Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun tarihi.
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INTRODUCTION
In an article written in the year 1924, the Turkish nationalist journalist and intellectual
Muhittin Birgen lamented the absence of a Turkish national history that could be taught
to children in the country's schools: 
What  a  great  misfortune  it  is  for  the  Turkish  nation  that,  having  with  an
enormous effort liberated itself from the grasp of the [Ottoman] empire, it has as
yet been unable to escape the grasp of the empire's historians. The supposedly
national  history books that  Turkish children are made to read in  our  schools
today ... contain nothing other than Ottoman history. Our historians, who are not
ashamed to call themselves Turks, are somehow unable to leave Ottoman history
behind.1
Birgen's call for textbooks that would teach the children of the Turkish Republic the
history  of  the  Turkish  nation  was  answered  in  the  year  1931.  That  year  saw  the
publication of a series of four secondary school (lise) history textbooks, titled simply
Tarih (History) I, II, III, IV, which purported to present an account of the history of the
Turkish nation from its pre-historical origins up until the time the books were written.
Revised editions of these books would be published between the years 1932 and 1934,2
and would form the basis of history education in Turkish high schools until the end of
the  decade.3
Büşra  Ersanlı  has  pointed  out  that  the  Turkish  national  history  presented  in  these
textbooks formed a crucial  part  of the new state  ideology of Kemalism, which was
developed by the leadership of the Turkish Republic in the early 1930s.4 An analysis of
the textbook narrative can thus help to contribute to our understanding of Kemalism
itself, of the worldview of its framers, and of the historical context within which these
1 Quoted in Zeki Arıkan, “Ders Kitaplarında Avrupa Tarihi,” in Tarih Öğretimi ve Ders Kitapları – Buca 
Sempozyumu, ed. Salih Özbaran (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1995), 154. Translation my own.
2 Türk Tarih Tetkik Cemiyeti, Tarih I – Tarihtenevelki Zamanlar ve Eski Zamanlar (Istanbul: Devlet Matbaası, 
1932). 
Türk Tarih Tetkik Cemiyeti, Tarih II – Ortazamanlar (Istanbul: Devlet Matbaası, 1933).
Türk Tarih Tetkik Cemiyeti, Tarih III – Yeni ve Yakın Zamanlar (Istanbul: Devlet Matbaası, 1933).
Türk Tarih Tetkik Cemiyeti, Tarih IV – Türkiye Cümhuriyeti (Istanbul: Devlet Matbaası, 1934).
3 Erdal Aslan, “Devrim Tarihi Ders Kitaplari,” in Tarih Öğretimi ve Ders Kitapları, ed. Özbaran, 298.
4 Büşra Ersanlı Behar, İktidar ve Tarih: Türkiye'de “Resmi Tarih” Tezinin Oluşumu (1929-1937) (Istanbul: AFA 
Yayınları, 1992), 89.
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books were written. It is with this background in mind that I propose, in this thesis, to
engage in a close reading of the historical narrative presented in these texbooks.
Turkish history, the textbook authors claimed in their introduction, had been obscured or
misunderstood for centuries. This was supposedly due to a number of factors. First of
all,  the animosity of Western, Christian historians towards the Islamic world had led
them to depict the history of the Muslim Turks as consisting solely of “exploits of blood
and fire.” Muslim historians, in contrast, had tended to treat Turkish history as merely
an aspect of the broader sweep of Islamic history, and had therefore ignored the long
pre-Islamic history of the Turks. Finally, Ottoman historians, in their ambition to create
one  Ottoman  nation  out  of  the  distinct  elements  making  up  Ottoman  society,  had
neglected and ignored the history of the Turks as a separate nation. The new historical
account, so the authors hoped, would restore the Turkish nation to its rightful place in
history.5
This new account can be summarized as follows: The Turks were an ancient, civilized
and  racially  defined  nation  with  origins  in  Central  Asia.  From their  Central  Asian
homeland, the Turks had, in the depths of pre-history, migrated outward and settled in
different  parts  of  the  Eurasian  landmass,  including  Anatolia.  These  early  Turkish
migrations led to the first flowerings of civilization across the ancient world,  in the
Fertile Crescent,  China,  India,  Egypt,  and ancient Rome and Greece.  Following this
early civilizing wave, the Turkish nation continued to dominate the history of Asia,
founding  a  large  number  of  powerful  states  and  playing  a  prominent  role  in  the
development of the major Asian civilizations – Chinese,  Indian and Islamic – while
Europe remained stuck in the Dark Ages. In the early second millenium CE, the Turks
also resettled Anatolia, establishing the Anatolian Seljuk state, and, later, the Ottoman
Empire.  The  glorious  march  of  Turkish  history  was  temporarily  interrupted  by  the
decline  of  the  Ottoman Empire  –  caused mainly by the  empire's  cosmopolitan  and
Islamic nature – and the contemporaneous rise of Europe. The abolition of the Ottoman
Empire and the foundation of the Turkish Republic, however, laid the foundation for the
5 Tarih I, v.
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Turkish nation to once again assume the preeminent position among the nations of the
world that it had enjoyed in the past.
Like the Kemalist ideology which it was an integral part of, the new national history
was shaped by both pragmatic and ideological considerations.6 On a pragmatic level, it
was designed to provide a historical legitimization for the abolition of the Ottoman
Empire and its replacement by the Turkish Republic, and for the program of nation-
building and Westernizing/secularizing reform embarked on by the leadership of the
Turkish  republic  around  Mustafa  Kemal  (Atatürk)  in  the  1920s  and  1930s.  On  an
ideological level, the narrative itself reflected the ideological convictions that had led
the Turkish republican elite to embark on their project of nation-building and reform in
the first place: a strong Turkish nationalism; an acceptance of both the superiority and
the universality of Western civilization; and a positivist belief in science and rational
thought as the forces advancing human civilization, coupled to a rejection of religion in
general, and Islam in particular, as an obstacle in the path of human progress.7
In addition to this, the Kemalist version of Turkish national history needs also to be
understood in the context of two major historiographical currents in the late Ottoman
Empire and early Turkish Republic. The first of these, linked to the Turkist movement,
located the origins of the Turkish nation in the depths of Central Asia, and stressed the
central role of the Turks in spreading civilization.8 The second current, developed partly
in  opposition  to  Turkism,  emphasized  the  centrality  of  Anatolia,  as  the  national
homeland,  to  Turkish  nationhood.9 Both  of  these  historiographical  currents  had  an
influence on the Kemalist historical narrative.
6 Halil Berktay, “Dünyada ve Türkiye'de Tarihçiliğin Durumu ve “Dilinin Evrenselleşmesi” Üzerine Düşünceler,” 
in Tarih Öğretimi ve Ders Kitapları, ed. Özbaran, 74. For a discussion of the mixed ideological and pragmatic 
nature of Kemalism, see Paul Dumont, “The Origins of Kemalist Ideology,” in Atatürk and the Modernization of 
Turkey, ed. Jacob M. Landau  (Boulder, CO: Westwood Press), 25-26.
7 M. Şükrü Hanioğlu, Atatürk: An Intellectual Biography (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 
2011), 130-131.
8 Etienne Copeaux, Tarih Ders Kitaplarında (1931-1993) Türk Tarih Tezinden Türk-İslam Sentezine, trans. Ali 
Berktay (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1998), 23.
9 Hasan Akbayrak, Milletin Tarihinden Ulusun Tarihine: İkinci Meşrutiyet'ten Cumhuriyet'e Ulus-Devlet İnşa 
Sürecinde Kurumsal Tarih Çalışmaları (Istanbul: Kitabevi, 2009), 224-225.
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In line with the above discussion, this thesis is divided into three chapters. The first
chapter provides an account of the Turkish state's twin programs of nation-building and
Westernizing/secularizing  reform  throughout  the  1920s,  and  a  discussion  of  the
ideological background to these programs. The final section of the chapter chronicles
the growing popular opposition to the state's reforms and policies,  and the resulting
decision by the Turkish leadership to create a legitimizing ideology. The second chapter
presents  a  brief  account  of  the  writing  of  the  new national  history,  and places  this
history in its historiographical context. The third chapter, finally, contains an analysis of
the history of  the  Turkish nation  as  presented in  the  Tarih  textbooks.  This  analysis
roughly follows the chronology of the textbook account, and is divided into four main
sections. The first section covers the supposed origins and racial characteristics of the
Turkish nation, and the construction of Anatolia as the Turkish national homeland. The
second section covers the textbook account of the ancient Turks' role in the spread of
civilization, and also offers an analysis of how the textbooks depicted the civilization of
these  early  Turks.  The  third  section  analyzes  the  textbooks'  Turkification  of  Asian
history, and how the history of (Turkish) Asia was constructed in opposition to that of
Europe.  The fourth  section  focuses  on  the  depiction  of  the  history of  the  Ottoman
Empire, and particularly on the textbook account of Otttoman decline.
While this thesis offers, to the extent of my knowledge, the first in-depth study of the
entirety of the historical narrative found in the Tarih textbooks, aspects of the textbook
narrative have previously been taken in  hand by a  number of  scholars.  Thus Büşra
Ersanlı has written a detailed account of the development of Kemalist historiography in
the 1930s, but focuses more on the proceedings and discussions of the Turkish History
Congresses of 1932 and 1937 than on the content of the textbooks.10 Ersanlı has also
authored a chapter on the historiography of the Ottoman Empire during the Kemalist
period.11 Etienne Copeaux, meanwhile, has analyzed the Tarih textbooks as part of his
study of the development of Turkish history textbooks over the period 1931-1993.12
Aspects of Kemalist historiography were also discussed at a conference on the topic of
10 Ersanlı Behar, İktidar ve Tarih.
11 Büşra Ersanlı, “The Ottoman Empire in the Historiography of the Kemalist Era: A Theory of Fatal Decline,” in 
The Ottomans and the Balkans: A Discussion of Historiography, ed. Fikret Adanır et al. (Leiden, Boston and 
Köln: Brill, 2002).
12 Copeaux, Tarih Ders Kitaplarında (1931-1993) Türk Tarih Tezinden Türk-İslam Sentezine
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Turkish history textbooks held in 1994.13 Finally, Doğan Gürpınar has also drawn on the
Kemalist  textbook narrative as part  of  his  study of the changing perceptions of  the
Turkish nation in the period 1860-1950.14 All these studies have been consulted in the
writing of this thesis and, where appropriate, their authors' insights have been used.
13 Tarih Öğretimi ve Ders Kitapları, ed. Özbaran.
14 Doğan Gürpınar, Ottoman/Turkish Visions of the Nation, 1860-1950 (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2013).
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CHAPTER 1
THE HISTORICAL AND IDEOLOGICAL CONTEXT
1.1. The Creation of the Turkish Nation State
1.1.1. The National Struggle and the Establishment of the Turkish Republic
By late 1918 the Ottoman Empire, having allied itself with the Central Powers during
the  First  World  War,  was  forced  to  acknowledge  defeat.  With  only  the  empire's
Anatolian territories yet free of Allied occupation, and with the Allied armies advancing
on all fronts, the Ottoman government accepted the ceasefire terms offered by Britain,
and Ottoman delegates signed the armistice treaty of Moudros on 30 October 1918.
Leading members of the İttihat ve Terâkki Cemiyeti (Committee of Union and Progress,
CUP), the Young Turk organization which, after seizing power in a coup in 1913, had
led the Ottoman Empire through the war, fled the country the very next day.15
The CUP government had realized the imminence of Ottoman defeat, however, and had
therefore, during the final month of the war, laid the foundations of an armed movement
that would be able to resist the potential occupation of Anatolia by the Allied powers or
their  confederates.16 Popular  support  for  this  movement,  based  around  so-called
“societies  for  the  defence  of  national  rights”  of  the  Anatolian  Muslims  against  the
separatist demands (both real and imagined) of Anatolian Christians, increased rapidly
after the Greek occupation of Izmir in May 1919.17 Following his arrival in Anatolia
later that month, Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk), an early member of the CUP and a military
officer who had made a name for himself in a number of campaigns throughout the First
World War, was able to gradually consolidate this movement under his own leadership.18
15 Erik Jan Zürcher, The Unionist Factor: The Role of the Committee of Union and Progress in the Turkish 
National Movement 1905-1926 (Leiden: E.J.Brill, 1984), 72.
16 Ibid., 82.
17 Ibid., 105.
18 Ibid., 118-119.
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The  first  congress  bringing  together  delegates  from a  large  number  of  “defence  of
rights”  societies  was  held  in  Erzurum in  July  1919,  and  ended  with  a  declaration
insisting on the territorial integrity of all Ottoman lands within the armistice lines of
1918.19 This was reiterated in  the National  Pact  (Misak-ı  Millî),  adopted in  January
1920,  which  remained  the  defining  declaration  of  the  movement's  aims  until  the
signature of the peace treaty of Lausanne in 1923.20 This pact described the Ottoman
territories  within  the  armistice  lines  that  were  inhabited  by  a  (non-Arab)  Ottoman
Muslim majority as the indivisible homeland of the Ottoman Muslims.21 It was also in
early 1920 that the headquarters of the resistance movement in Ankara aqcuired the
character of a full-fledged government, with the first convocation, in April, of the Büyük
Millet Meclisi, or Grand National Assembly.22
The Anatolian resistance movement's worst fears regarding Allied designs on Ottoman
territory were confirmed by the terms of the peace treaty of Sèvres, which was signed
by representatives of the Istanbul-based Ottoman government headed by Sultan Mehmet
VI in August 1920. The treaty essentially foresaw the partition of Anatolia. Large parts
of south-eastern and south-western Anatolia  were declared,  respectively,  French and
Italian  zones  of  influence.  An independent  Armenian  republic  was  to  be created  in
eastern Anatolia. Eastern Thrace was to be annexed by Greece, as – pending a plebiscite
– were the city of Izmir and it surroundings, which the Greek army had occupied in
May 1919.  The mainly Kurdish  areas  in  south-eastern  Anatolia  were  to  be  granted
autonomy, with the right to make an appeal for national independence to the League of
Nations within a year. This left the Ottoman state with Istanbul, and with a small piece
of territory covering central Anatolia and the central Black Sea coast.23
The Anatolian resistance movement rejected the Sèvres treaty, portraying the Ottoman
government as traitors for assenting to its terms. The Allies lacked the will  to push
through the implementation of the treaty by force of arms, and therefore reluctantly
19 Erik Jan Zürcher, Turkey: A Modern History, 3rd ed. (London and New York: I.B.Tauris, 2004), 150.
20 Erik Jan Zürcher, The Young Turk Legacy and Nation Building: From the Ottoman Empire to Atatürk's Turkey 
(London and New York: I.B.Tauris, 2010), 228.
21 Ibid., 228.
22 Zürcher, Turkey, 151-152.
23 Ibid., 147.
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accepted the offer of the Greek government to send its armies further east from their
base of operations in western Anatolia, and thus to force the resistance to accept the
treaty's  terms.24 The Greek invasion of Anatolia in the summer of 1920 marked the
beginning of hostilities between the Greeks and the Anatolian national resistance, which
ended when the Turkish cavalry rode into Izmir in August 1922. Separate campaigns by
the  resistance  armies  against  the  newly formed  Armenian  Republic  in  the  southern
Caucasus, in which the Anatolian forces conquered the town of Kars, which had been
lost to the Russians in the 1877-78 war, and against the French occupation of the region
of Cilicia in the south-east of modern-day Turkey were also successful.25 By late 1922,
the victory of the Anatolian forces in what would become known as the Liberation War
(Kurtuluş  Savaşı)  or  the  National  Struggle  (Millî  Mücadele)  was  thus  assured.  A
ceasefire was signed in October 1922, paving the way for negotiations that culminated
in the signature of the peace treaty of Lausanne in July 1923. This treaty superseded the
Sèvres treaty, and accorded the new state, ruled by the Grand National Assembly, full
sovereignty over almost the entire territory it had laid claim to in the National Pact of
1920.26 At the behest of Mustafa Kemal, and with the approval of the national assembly,
this new state was proclaimed as the Turkish Republic on 29 October 1923. Mustafa
Kemal became the republic's first president.
1.1.2. Creating the Nation State
As early as 1 November 1922, the Grand National Assembly had passed a resolution
deposing the last Ottoman sultan, Mehmed VI. The sovereignty of the sultan was to be
assumed by the nation, as the Ottoman Empire was replaced by a new, national state.27
The national character of the new state was enshrined in the first constitution of the
Turkish Republic, adopted by the assembly on 20 April 1924, which clearly articulated
the sovereignty of the nation: “Sovereignty belongs without restriction to the nation.”28
The Turkish political leadership's decision that the republic was to be a nation state
24 Ibid., 147.
25 Ibid., 153.
26 Ibid., 162.
27 Edward Mead Earle, “The New Constitution of Turkey,” Political Science Quarterly 40:1 (1925), 85.
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rested on their conviction that nation states were the only modern and scientific form of
political  community.29 Nation  states'  modernity  and  scientific  nature,  they  believed,
made them more cohesive and powerful, and ultimately more successful, than political
communities – such as the Ottoman Empire – not based on a single nation. The truth of
this  assessment  seemed  to  have  been  borne  out  by  the  success  of  the  nationalist
separatist  movements  which  sprang  up  in  various  parts  of  the  Ottoman  Empire,
particularly  in  the  Balkans,  in  the  final  century  of  the  empire's  existence,  and  the
subsequent establishment of a number of nation states on formerly Ottoman territory.
Conversely, the success of these movements also appeared to demonstrate the weakness
of the multinational Ottoman Empire. As the  Tarih III  textbook would put it in 1931,
“The Ottoman Empire was too large, its population was not homogeneous ... there was
no  shared,  solid  spiritual  bond  between  the  many  different  elements  that  made  up
Ottoman society.”30
Crucial to the conversion of the future leaders of the Turkish Republic to nationalism
were their experiences as young military officers in the Ottoman province of Macedonia
in  the  years  1904-1908.  In  their  campaigns  against  Greek,  Serbian,  Bulgarian  and
Macedonian  komitacis  (guerilla fighters), the Ottoman officers were impressed by the
strong nationalist sentiments that sustained the komitacis in their fight against Ottoman
rule.  Hanioğlu recounts  one instance in  which the spectacle  of  a group of captured
Bulgarian fighters being serenaded with the Bulgarian national anthem by a gathering
crowd of civilians led the Ottoman officers who witnessed the scene to question why the
Ottoman Empire did not have its own anthem, only marches dedicated to the Ottoman
sultans.  In  this  sense,  he  argues,  the  Macedonian  campaign served  as  “a  school  of
nationalism” for many future members of the Turkish Republic's ruling elite.31
28 Article 3 of the 1924 constitution. See Earle, 89. Sovereigny was to be exercised on behalf of the nation by the 
Grand National Assembly. From the foundation of the republic until 1945, and with the exception of two brief 
interludes in 1924-25 and in 1930, the assembly would be composed exclusively of parliamentarians belonging 
to the Cumhuriyet Halk Fırkası (Republican People's Party, RPP), led by Mustafa Kemal and, after his death in 
1938, by İsmet İnönü. During the period under consideration, the Turkish Republic can thus be described as a 
one-party state. See Zürcher, Turkey, 176.
29 Bobby S. Sayyid, A Fundamental Fear: Eurocentrism and the Emergence of Islamism (London and New York: 
Zed Books, 1997), 65.
30 “Osmanlı İmparatorluğu çok genişti, ahalisi mütecanis değildi. Osmanlı ictimaî heyetini teşkil eden başka başka
unsurlar arasında ... müşterek ve esaslı manevî bir bağ yoktu.” Tarih III, 115. Translation my own. All 
subsequent translations of textbook extracts are also my own.
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1.1.3. Defining the Nation
Yet how was the nation to be defined? Zürcher, basing himself on an analysis of the
policies of the CUP government and on the pronouncements of leading actors in the
national resistance movement, has argued that both the CUP and the national resistance
leaders adhered to a “peculiar brand of Ottoman Muslim nationalism.”32 In Zürcher's
reading, the CUP and the national resistance aimed to defend the rights and interests of
the  empire's  Muslims,  defined  as  a  nation  in  contradistinction  to  the  Christians
(predominantly Greeks and Armenians) who had dominated the Ottoman economy since
the  mid-19th  century  and  whose  nationalist  separatist  aspirations  had  led  to  major
Ottoman territorial losses throughout the 19th and early 20th centuries.33 With the loss
of the empire's remaining European lands in the Balkan wars of 1912-13, and the Allied
occupation of Ottoman territories in the Levant, Arabia and Mesopotamia during the
First World War, this nationalism also acquired a territorial, Anatolian dimension. In this
reading,  the nation was both religiously and geographically defined:  the markers of
national belonging were adherence to Islam and residence within the borders of the
National Pact.
While  Islam did  play  an  important  role  in  the  nationalism of  the  CUP and  of  the
Anatolian resistance, there was also another aspect to their conception of the nation.
Thus,  from  the  turn  of  the  century  onward,  leading  members  of  the  Young  Turk
movement had begun to espouse a Turkish, rather than an Ottoman Muslim nationalism,
which defined the Turkish nation as a linguistically and culturally distinct entity. The
roots of this Turkish nationalism can be traced back to the 19th century. In the course of
the  modernizing  Tanzimat  reforms,  and  in  the  face  of  the  nationalist  separatist
endeavours of various subject populations of the empire, a number of Ottoman Muslim
31 Hanioğlu, Atatürk, 64. A good example of Ottoman Muslims' turn away from a commitment to the Ottoman 
Empire, and towards nationalism, is provided by the writer Ömer Seyfettin. In his 1916 short story “Flags of 
Liberty” (Hürriyet Bayrakları), set in Macedonia in the aftermath of the 1908 constitutional revolution, Seyfettin
(through the story's narrator, a disillusioned Ottoman officer) depicts nations as primordial social entities, and the
nationalist separatism of the empire's ethnic groups as therefore justified. The Ottoman Empire's multinational 
nature, the narrator argues, is unnatural, and the empire is bound to disintegrate because of it. Rather than 
attempting to keep the empire alive, therefore, the Turks should found their own nation state. See Ömer 
Seyfettin, “Hürriyet Bayrakları,” in Ömer Seyfettin, Bütün Eserleri: Hikâyeler 1, ed. Hülya Argunşah (Istanbul: 
Dergâh Yayınları, 1999), 229-237.
32 Zürcher, The Young Turk Legacy and Nation Building, 230.
33 Ibid., 230.
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intellectuals had come to conceive of the empire's Turkish-speaking Muslim subjects as
the unsur-ı aslî, the “fundamental element” on which the Ottoman Empire was built.34
On one level, Muslim Turkish-speakers were seen as more reliable and as more loyal to
the Ottoman state than the other Muslim ethno-linguistic groups ruled by the empire
(Kurds, Arabs, Bosnians etc.) and, particularly, than the empire's Christian millets. On
another level, they were also regarded as more civilized and modern than the Kurds and
Arabs on the empire's southern and eastern periphery, and thus as the natural leaders of
the empire's modernizing efforts.35
The perception of the empire's Muslim Turkish-speakers as a separate nation was given
a further impetus by the emergence, in the late 19th century, of the Turkist (Türkçü)
movement.  Drawing on the work of Western Orientalists, and inspired by contemporary
developments in European nationalist thought, Turkist intellectuals developed a vision
of the Ottoman Turks as members of a distinct, originally Central Asian nation whose
roots  extended  far  into  the  pre-Ottoman  and  even  pre-Islamic  past,  and  whose
membership  included  all  peoples  who  spoke  a  language  belonging  to  the  Turkic
family.36 These views would have a strong influence on the Young Turk movement.
Thus,  from  the  last  years  of  the  19th  century  onward,  a  number  of  Young  Turk
publications began to emphasize the distinctness and superior nature of the Ottoman
Turks,  not  just  compared  to  the  empire's  remaining  Christian  subjects,  but  also
compared to the other Muslim subjects of the empire.37 
Reflecting the Turkish nationalist convictions of Mustafa Kemal, who would later trace
the  awakening  of  his  national  consciousness  to  his  reading  of  the  poems  of  the
influential Turkist author Mehmet Emin (Yurdakul),38 the constitution adopted by the
Grand National Assembly in 1924 was based on a Turkish, rather than an Anatolian
Muslim definition of the nation: “Our state is a nation-state. It is not a multi-national
34 Selim Deringil, “They Live in a State of Nomadism and Savagery: The Late Ottoman Empire and the Post-
Colonial Debate,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 45:2 (2003), 328.
35 Ussama Makdisi, “Rethinking Ottoman Imperialism: Modernity, Violence and the Cultural Logic of Ottoman 
Reform,” in The Empire in the City: Arab Provincial Capitals in the Ottoman Empire, ed. Jens Hanssen et al. 
(Beirut and Würzburg: Orient-Institut der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft, 2002), 45.
36 David Kushner, The Rise of Turkish Nationalism 1876-1908 (London: Frank Cass, 1977), 7.
37 M. Şükrü Hanioğlu, Bir Siyasal Örgüt Olarak Osmanlı İttihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti ve Jön Türklük (1889-1902) 
(Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1989), 630-632.
38 Hanioğlu, Atatürk, 71-72.
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state. The state does not recognize any nation other than Turks.”39 Yet this does not mean
that the Muslim nationalism that had, at least in part, informed the aims and policies of
the CUP and of the national resistance completely disappeared with the promulgation of
the constitution. Islam did continue to play its part as a marker of national belonging in
the Turkish Republic, as became clear in the Turkish state's different treatment of its
Muslim and Christian  minorities.  This  difference  will  be  analyzed in  the  following
section.
1.1.4. Turkifying Anatolia
By the  mid-1920s,  mostly  as  a  result  of  the  massacre  and  forced  expulsion  from
Anatolia of the vast majority of the Ottoman Empire's Armenian subjects in 1915, and
of  the  population  exchange  with  Greece  in  1924,  in  which  the  remaining  Greek
residents of Anatolia (defined as such based on their adherence to the Greek Orthodox
religion, rather than the language they spoke, which in some cases – as in that of the
Central  Anatolian  Karamanlıs  –  was  Turkish)40 were  deported  to  Greece,  Muslim
Turkish-speakers made up the overwhelming majority of the republic's population. The
first census carried out by the republic, in 1927, showed that more than 97% of the
republic's citizens were Muslim, and more than 86% spoke Turkish as a first language.41
Yet,  as  these  numbers  show,  the  population  of  the  republic  was  not  completely
homogeneous.  It  still  contained  a  fairly  large  linguistic  minority  –  consisting
predominantly  of  speakers  of  a  variety  of  Kurdish  languages  concentrated  in  the
country's south-east – and smaller, but (at least in the eyes of the republican leadership)
not insignificant religious minorities – mostly Greek or Armenian Christians, as well as
a small Jewish community.42
39 Quoted in Mesut Yeğen, “Banditry to Disloyalty: Turkish Nationalisms and the Kurdish Question,” in Symbiotic 
Antagonisms: Sources, Discourses and Changing Nature of Turkish, Kurdish and Islamic Nationalisms in 
Turkey, ed. Fuat Keyman et al. (Salt Lake City: The University of Utah Press, 2010), 229.
40 Richard Clogg, “A Millet Within a Millet: The Karamanlides,” in Ottoman Greeks in the Age of Nationalism: 
Politics, Economy and Society in the Nineteenth Century, ed. Dimitri Gondicas et al. (Princeton, NJ: The Darwin 
Press, Inc., 1999), 115.
41 Soner Çağaptay, Islam, Secularism and Nationalism in Modern Turkey: Who is a Turk? (Oxon and New York: 
Routledge, 2006), 16.
42 Ibid., 16.
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The experience of the National Struggle and the memory of the Sèvres treaty, which
Jung  and  Piccoli  have  described  as  “the  historical  culmination  of  ...  the  Kemalist
experience  of  external  conspiracy  and  internal  betrayal,”43 made  the  republican
leadership  deeply  suspicious  of  these  minorities,  particularly of  the  Christians.  The
minorities were seen as a potential fifth column that could threaten the political and
territorial cohesion of the Turkish Republic – a threat which needed to be neutralized.
In order to combat the putative threat which these respective minorities posed to the
Turkish Republic, the republican leadership adopted different approaches. Following a
pattern  set  during  the  CUP  era,44 the  Christian  minorities  were  systematically
marginalized, a process that accelerated after religious minority leaders were pressured,
in 1925, into giving up the privileges their communities had been accorded by the treaty
of Lausanne. Among other things, Christians were excluded from state (and, to a certain
extent, private) employment, their freedom of movement was curtailed, and their ability
to purchase or own property was impeded.45 All  of these policies  were designed to
exclude Christians as much as possible from the economic, political and cultural life of
the country, and contributed to a gradual exodus of Christians, particularly of Anatolian
Armenians, from the Turkish Republic throughout the 1920s.46
The  Turkish  state's  approach  to  the  Kurdish  minority  differed,  in  intention  if  not
necessarily in execution, from its treatment of the Christian minorities. It is here that the
Ottoman Muslim nationalism highlighted  by Zürcher  becomes  apparent.  Due to  the
religion they shared with the Turkish-speaking majority, and due to their support for the
Anatolian resistance movement during the National Struggle, the Anatolian Kurds were
accorded the  status  of  “prospective  Turks:”  they could,  if  they adopted the Turkish
language and Turkish culture,  become full-fledged members  of the Turkish nation.47
Unlike  the  Anatolian  Christians,  whose  religion  and  opposition  to  the  resistance
43 Dietrich Jung and Wolfgango Piccoli, Turkey at the Crossroads (London: Zed Books, 2001), 149. Quoted in 
Fatma Müge Göçek, The Transformation of Turkey: Redefining State and Society from the Ottoman Empire to 
the Modern Era (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 2011), 102.
44 Uğur Ümit Üngör, “Seeing like a nation-state: Young Turk social engineering in Eastern Turkey, 1913-1950,” 
Journal of Genocide Research 10:1 (2008), 28-29.
45 Çağaptay, 28.
46 Ibid., 35.
47 Mesut Yeğen, ““Prospective Turks” or “Pseudo-Citizens:” Kurds in Turkey,” Middle East Journal 63:4 (2009), 
597.
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movement blocked their path to full membership of the Turkish nation, the Kurds could
become assimilated into the Turkish nation.48
Yet  the  support  of  the  Kurds  for  the  Anatolian  resistance  movement  had  not  been
unconditional. It had been based both on promises of greater autonomy for the Kurdish
areas within a future Anatolian state, and on the strong Islamic rhetoric used by the
leaders  of  the  Anatolian  resistance,  which  presented  the  war  as  a  fight  for  the
preservation of the Caliphate. The definition of the republic as a Turkish nation state in
the 1924 constitution and the abolition of the Caliphate in the same year could thus not
but incite discontent among the republic's Kurdish population.49 This discontent broke
through in the Sheikh Said uprising of February 1925, in which an alliance of Kurdish
intellectuals,  officers,  civil  servants and religious leaders,  supported by a significant
proportion of the local population, seized control of a large area in the country's south-
east.50 The state responded to the rebellion with a great deal of force. Sheikh Said and
his  closest  supporters  were  hanged,  and  leading families  accused of  supporting  the
rebellion were deported to western Turkey, as well as having their properties confiscated
by the state.51 Then, in  June 1927, the Grand National Assembly passed Law 1164,
which created an Inspectorate-General to administer the south-eastern majority-Kurdish
provinces. Armed with extraordinary powers, İbrahim Talî, the first Inspector-General,
implemented a range of policies aimed at  Turkifying the Kurdish population.  These
included the breaking up of large estates belonging to Kurdish tribal leaders as a way of
reducing their influence, the use of primary schools and branches of the Turkish Hearths
(Türk Ocakları) cultural association to spread Turkish culture and the Turkish language,
and the conscription of young Kurdish men into the Turkish army.52 Many of these
policies continued into the 1930s. While their efficacity has been questioned,53 they are
a testament to the determination of the leadership of the early Turkish Republic to create
a homogeneous Turkish nation within the borders of the Turkish nation state.
48 Çağaptay, 21.
49 Zürcher, Turkey, 177-178.
50 Üngör, 29.
51 Çağaptay, 22
52 Ibid, 23.
53 Senem Aslan, “Everyday Forms of State Power and the Kurds in the Early Turkish Republic,” International 
Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 43 (2011), 81.
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1.2. The Secularization and Westernization of State and Society
1.2.1. The Reforms
The creation of a homogeneous Turkish nation state out of the remains of the Ottoman
Empire  was  only  one  aspect  of  the  ambitious  reform project  embarked  on  by  the
leadership of the early Turkish republic. The project also involved the secularization of
the Turkish state and, more ambitiously, the secularization and Westernization of the
population living inside the borders of the Turkish Republic.
The secularization of the state began with the abolition of the Caliphate in 1924.54 That
same year saw the abolition of the office of Şeyhülislam (the highest religious authority
in the Ottoman Empire) and the Ministry of Religious Affairs and Pious Foundations
(which was replaced by two directorates – the Directorate for Religious Affairs and the
Directorate-General  for  Pious  Foundations).  Education  was  both  standardized  and
secularized  through  the  Law  on  the  Unification  of  Education  and  the  abolition  of
medreses  (religious schools), also in 1924. The Swiss civil code and the Italian penal
code were adopted in 1926, eliminating the use of  şeriat  (Islamic religious law) from
the judicial process. The removal of the article proclaiming Islam as the state religion of
the Turkish Republic from the constitution in 1928 may be seen as the final step in the
secularization of the Turkish state.55
The reforms also sought to eliminate the Islamic character of what may be described as
the frames of daily life – dates, times, the alphabet, measures – replacing them with
European frames. In 1926, the republic adopted the European way of telling the time
and the Gregorian calendar, respectively replacing  Ezanî  time, reckoned from sunset
and related to Muslim prayer times, and the Hijrī  calendar, which was based on lunar
months and took the year of Muhammed's flight from Mecca to Medina as its starting
point. An even more radical reform was the adoption, in 1928, of the Latin alphabet,
replacing the Arabic script which had been in use since the foundation of the Ottoman
54 Following the deposition of Mehmed VI in 1922, his cousin Abdülmecid II had been elected to the office of 
Caliph by the Turkish Grand National Assembly. He would occupy the position for only two years.
55 For an account of these reforms, see Zürcher, Turkey, 187
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Empire. In 1931, finally, the republic also adopted the metric system, replacing the old
measures of weight and capacity.56
 
Islam was also to be removed from the central position it occupied in Anatolian society
and culture. The most important step in this regard was the 1925 suppression of the
tarikats  (religious  brotherhoods),  which  had  been  the  focal  point  of  popular  Islam
throughout Ottoman history and which, in reaction to the increased European influence
in Ottoman political, economic and cultural life, had become more powerful during the
last decades of the Ottoman Empire.57 The reforms also targeted other aspects of popular
religion, such as religious dress and amulets, saints' shrines, and religious pilgrimages
and festivals.58
Islamic social and cultural practices were to be replaced by “Western” ones. The year
1925 saw the introduction of the “hat reform” prohibiting the  fez  and other religious
headwear  and enjoining  government  employees  to  wear  European-style  hats.59 The
Turkish public was also encouraged to adopt European-style social behaviour through
the publication, from the late 1920s onwards, of a number of pamphlets, such as the
Turkish  version  of  the  French  manual  Pour  bien  connaître  les  usages  mondains,
instructing its readers, among other things, in how to properly kiss the hand of a lady or
celebrate the new year.60
The Turkish leadership also saw the transformation of  the status  and appearance of
women as crucial to the Westernization of society.  The Swiss civil code, adopted in
1926, granted extensive rights to women and put them on a more equal legal footing
with men. Women were also granted the right to vote in municipal elections in 1930 and
in parliamentary elections in 1934. The Turkish  leadership also promoted a more public
role for women, as well as new female role models, such as Keriman Halis, who won
56 For an account of these reforms, see Hanioğlu, Atatürk, 214-218.
57 Zürcher, Turkey, 192.
58 Ibid., 192.
59 Hanioğlu, Atatürk, 207.
60 Ibid., 206
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the first Miss Turkey pageant in 1929 and went on to win the Miss World contest in
1932, or Sabiha Gökçen, the country's first female fighter pilot.61
Even the arts were Westernized. Thus, from the mid-1920s onward, the Turkish state
made a concerted attempt to replace traditional Alla Turca music with European music
styles,  which  culminated  in  the  removal,  in  1934,  of  traditional  music  from  the
programming of the state-run radio station. The Turkish state also promoted European
fine arts such as sculpture and painting.62 Finally, early Turkish republican architecture,
perhaps best represented by the government buildings of the new capital Ankara, was
strongly influenced by contemporary European architecture.63
1.2.2. The Ideological and Historical Background to the Reforms
1.2.2.1. Historical Progress, Universal Civilization and Westernization
The  Turkish  reform project  was,  as  Bryan  S.  Turner  has  pointed  out,  “consciously
mimetic in that it took Europe as its specific model of adaption.”64 In this regard, it was
not the first of its kind. As early as the 1830s, members of the educated Ottoman elite
had begun advocating the reform of Ottoman state and society along European lines.65
Their  call  for  reform was  based  on  the  acceptance  of  the  Enlightenment  discourse
surrounding the concept of civilization which had emerged in Europe in the late 18th
century.  This  discourse  equated  the  highest  level  of  civilization  with  European
modernity,66 but  also  portrayed  European  modernity  as  universal  and  therefore
potentially  applicable  to  all  human  societies.  European  societies  had  reached  their
current level of civilization by passing through a number of stages. If non-European
societies followed the path pioneered by Europe, they too could become as civilized as
the  Europeans.  In  line  with  this  conception  of  civilization  as  universal  and  human
61 Ibid., 210-212.
62 Ibid., 219-221
63 Ibid., 222.
64 Bryan S. Turner, Weber and Islam (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1974), 168. Quoted in Sayyid, 67-68.
65 Cemil Aydın, The Politics of Anti-Westernism in Asia (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 15.
66 Aslı Çırakman, “Reflections of European Self-Images in Ottoman Mirrors,” in Remaking Turkey: Globalization, 
Alternative Modernities, and Democracy, ed. Fuat Keyman (Plymouth: Lexington Books, 2007), 26.
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history as linear progress,  Ottoman reformers pushed for reform of the state and of
society in order to catch up with the “civilized” nations of the 19th century: Britain,
France, Prussia and (somewhat more ambiguously) Russia.67
These reformers saw Westernization as desirable in and of itself, believing, in line with
the discourse outlined above, that it would allow the Ottoman Empire to reach a higher
level of civilizational development.68 Yet their reform attempts were also based on a
more prosaic consideration. By enacting reforms, they hoped that the empire would be
accepted into the family of civilized European nations, and in this way escape the fate
suffered by many non-European states – colonization at the hands of one or other of the
European  powers.69 In  this  sense,  the  Gülhane  Edict  of  1839,  which  launched  the
Tanzimat  project  of  modernizing/Westernizing  the  Ottoman  Empire  was  a  “clear
acknowledgment  of  the  existence  of  a  Eurocentric  international  society  and  its
legitimizing  discourse  of  universal  civilization,”  which  “challenged  the  Eurocentric
international order to clarify its principles of inclusion.”70
Many  Tanzimat-era reformers  advocated  not  only  the  import  of  Western  science,
technology  and  political  institutions,  but  also  the  adoption  of  European  social  and
cultural norms, believing that true modernity could only be attained in this way.71 Yet
over  the  course  of  the  19th  century,  this  position  was  increasingly  challenged  in
Ottoman  intellectual  circles,  particularly  by  members  of  the  Young  Ottoman
oppositional movement which emerged in the 1860s. Rather than total Westernization in
all areas of life, the Young Ottomans advocated the adoption of European advances in
science and administration, but warned against excessive Westernization in society and
culture. Thus Namık Kemal, perhaps the foremost Young Ottoman thinker, argued for a
distinction between scientific/economic progress, associated with the West, and moral
progress, associated with Islam.72 Another prominent Ottoman intellectual of the period,
67 Makdisi, 30.
68 Aydın, 18.
69 Halil Berktay, “Geschichte, gesellschaftliches Gedächtnis und die aktuelle Neurose,” in Grenzfall 
Europa/Avrupanın Ince Esiginde: Deutsch-Türkisches Symposium 1998/Türk-Alman Sempozyumu 1998 
(Hamburg: edition Körber-Stiftung), 156.
70 Aydın, 19.
71 Ibid., 18.
72 Şerif Mardin, The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2000), 324.
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Ahmet Midhat Efendi, contrasted the material progress of Europe with what he saw as
its moral decadence and cautioned his Ottoman Muslim readership against emulating
European morality.73
The  debate  about  the  extent  to  which  reform should  include  the  Westernization  of
society and culture  continued throughout  the  final  decades  of  the  Ottoman Empire,
pitting “partial Westernizers” against “comprehensive Westernizers.” One of the main
proponents of partial westernization was the prominent Turkish nationalist thinker Ziya
Gökalp.  Inspired  by  the  example  of  Japanese  modernization,  Gökalp  argued  for  a
distinction between the concepts of “culture” (hars), which was specific to a particular
nation and expressed itself through popular music, proverbs, poetry, religion etc, and
“civilization” (medeniyet), which was universal but whose current level of development
was the result of the advances in science and administration associated with European
modernity.  A nation  could,  so  he  argued,  adopt  this  universal  civilization  (that  is
European science, technology and state institutions) without giving up its own culture.74
Comprehensive Westernizers like Abdullah Cevdet, on the other hand, argued against
such a distinction, seeing Europe as the “peak of superiority,” whose civilization needed
to be adopted “with its roses and its thorns.”75
In their desire to completely Westernize Turkish society, the early Turkish republican
elite  around  Mustafa  Kemal  were  clearly  influenced  by  these  “comprehensive
Westernizers.”76 Through  their  reforms  they  aimed  to  totally  transform society  and
culture in accordance with the model provided by European societies.  In this  sense,
these reforms may be seen as an attempt at social and cultural revolution imposed from
above.  Underlying  their  attempts  to  Westernize Turkish society and culture  was the
belief that Western civilization (=European modernity) was unitary and undivisible.77 It
was thus not possible to accept certain aspects of European modernity while rejecting
others. Modernity needed to be accepted completely, or not at all. “Modernization was
73 Carter Vaughn Findley, “An Ottoman Occidentalist in Europe: Ahmet Midhat Meets Madame Gülnar, 1889,” 
The American Historical Review, 103:1 (1998), 43-45.
74 Andrew Davison, “Laiklik and Turkey's “Cultural” Modernity: Remaking Turkey into Conceptual Space 
Occupied by “Europe,”” in Keyman (ed), Remaking Turkey, 42.
75 Quoted in Hanioğlu, Atatürk, 58-59.
76 Hanioğlu, 59.
77 Ibid., 204.
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only  possible  if  one  created  the  conditions  that  had  made  European  modernization
possible. Since the preconditions of European modernization were European cultural
practices, to be truly modernized one had to accept European culture.”78 
Yet  it  needs  to  be  pointed  out  that,  like  their  Ottoman  predecessors,  the  republic's
reformers did not push for the Westernization of their country simply because of their
admiration for Western civilization, although this undoubtedly played a part. Like the
Tanzimat  reforms, the republican reform project was also,  to an extent,  defensive in
nature. The Turkish nation needed to adopt Western civilization in order to survive in a
world dominated and shaped by that civilization. If it did not, it was doomed to eventual
destruction.79 The need to Westernize had become even more urgent in the eyes of the
republican leadership because of the role played by European intervention in the demise
of the Ottoman Empire, and in the near-defeat of the Anatolian resistance movement
during  the  Turkish  National  Struggle.  The  perceived  urgency  and  necessity  of
Westernization is reflected in an oft-quoted line from a speech given by Mustafa Kemal
in 1925: “Civilization is such a strong fire that it burns and destroys those who remain
indifferent to it.”80 The Westernizing efforts of the early Turkish leadership thus resulted
from conflicting impulses: on the one hand, a great admiration for the achievements of
Western modernity and, on the other, a deep fear of the West.81
1.2.2.2. Islam as the Constitutive Other of Turkish Modernity
The Turkish republican leadership's reform program thus took the European experience
of  modernity as  a  model;  the  reforms  aimed  to  raise  the  Turkish  Republic  and  its
citizens to the level of Western modernity. Yet the fact that these reforms were deemed
necessary in the first place implied that Turkish society was not (yet) modern, not (yet)
developed; compared to the societies of Europe, it was backward. Turkish backwardness
was conceptualized not just in temporal terms (“Turkey is backward compared to the
78 Sayyid, 68.
79 Göçek, 131.
80 “Medeniyet öyle kuvvetli bir ateştir ki, ona bigâne kalanları yakar, mahveder.” Quoted in Tarih IV, 235.
81 Halil Berktay has described this attitude as the “love-hate relationship” binding Turkey to Europe. Berktay, 
“Geschichte,” 153.
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West.”), but also in geographical terms (“Turkey is not part of the civilized West, it must
therefore  belong  to  the  uncivilized  East”).  Bobby  S.  Sayyid  has  argued  that  the
republican leadership constructed Turkish backwardness/Easternness around the marker
of Islam. Islam was the constitutive other in opposition to which the leaders of the early
republic defined the modern state and society they aimed to create; it was through Islam
that Turkish backwardness vis-a-vis the developed, civilized West was conceptualized
and explained.82
This view of Islam as an obstacle in the path of progress can in part be explained by the
Turkish  leadership's  scientistic  worldview.  Scientism,  a  key  element  of  the  obscure
19th-century doctrine of  Vulgärmaterialismus  subscribed to by many members of the
Young Turk movement – including Mustafa Kemal himself – who would go on to lead
the Turkish Republic,83 emphasized  the  unique  role  of  science  in  explaining  human
reality and in furthering the civilizational progress of human societies. The resulting
advocacy of a dominant role for science in the ordering of modern societies and states
was juxtaposed with a strong rejection of religion as obscurantist and as an obstacle in
the path of progress.84
The Turkish leadership's particular animus against Islam, in turn, stemmed from their
internalization of late 19th-century European Orientalist discourses which posited that
the pernicious influence of Islam was largely to  blame for the backwardness of the
Orient. Perhaps the most representative expression of this discourse was Ernest Renan's
lecture  “Islam and Science,”  given at  the  Sorbonne in  1883.  In this  lecture,  Renan
argued that the dogmatism of Islam (supposedly greater than that of Christianity) had
made it a serious obstacle to scientific progress in Muslim societies. Islam was opposed
to modernity and progress, and a Muslim modernity was therefore impossible.85 This
supposed antagonism between Islam and Western civilization was accepted by many
members of the early republican elite and clearly formed the basis for many of their
reforms.86 Thus, for example, the abolition of the Caliphate was presented as beneficial
82 Sayyid, 68-69.
83 Hanioğlu, Atatürk, 50.
84 Ibid., 51.
85 For a summary of Renan's lecture, see Aydın, 47-51.
86 Sayyid, 60-61.
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not just for the Turkish Republic, but for all Muslim societies, in that it removed a key
obstacle to these societies' “renewal and development.”87
Islam was also rejected for being an Arab religion.88 As Ussama Makdisi has pointed
out, in the course of the Tanzimat reforms of the mid-19th century, Ottoman statesmen
and intellectuals had begun to transpose the European colonialist discourse of a civilized
colonizing centre and a to-be-civilized colonized periphery onto the Ottoman Empire.
This not-yet-civilized periphery was identified mainly with the Arab provinces of the
empire. “Ottoman modernization created its discursive opposite, the pre-modern within
the empire, be it in the sands of Arabia or in cebel-i düruz [Mount Lebanon].”89 With the
rise of Turkism in the late 19th century, this contrast between the civilized centre and
the  backward  periphery  acquired  nationalist  connotations.  Ottoman  reforms  came
increasingly to be seen as “the desire of the modernizing “Turkish” nation to aid and
civilize a backwards “Arab” nation.”90 This view of Arab culture as backward and anti-
modern was shared by the early republican elite. If the Turkish nation was to become
truly  modern  and  Turkish,  it  needed  to  leave  behind  all  vestiges  of  Arab  culture,
particularly  Islam.  As  one  early  republican  writer  and  politician  put  it:  “To  be
Westernized meant at the same time to escape from being Arabicized; it meant being
Turkified.”91
1.3. Popular Opposition to the Reforms and the Creation of a New Ideology
The implementation of the Turkish government's reform program met with significant
popular resistance, most markedly in the country's Kurdish south-east, where opposition
to the state's attempts to Turkify the population and a growing Kurdish nationalism were
the main motivating factors. While the 1925 Sheikh Said rebellion had been inspired by
87 “... umumiyetle islâmlık ve ayrı ayrı islâm milletler için hiçbir amelî ve müspet faydası bulunmadığı halde 
mutaassıp ve muhafazakâr zihniyete mesnet olarak teceddüt ve inkişaf cereyanlarının hızını kesen ... [hilâfeti] 
muhafaza ve idame doğru [değildi.]” Tarih IV, 162.
88 Hanioğlu, Atatürk, 63.
89 Makdisi, 32.
90 Ibid., 45.
91 Falih Rıfkı Atay, Çankaya (Istanbul: Doğan Kardeş Basımevi, 1969), 446. Quoted in Meltem Ahıska, 
“Occidentalism: The Historical Fantasy of the Modern,” South Atlantic Quarterly 102:2/3 (2003), 378.
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a combination of Kurdish nationalism and opposition to the abolition of the Caliphate,92
subsequent  uprisings  in  the  area  seem  to  have  been  more  purely  nationalist  in
character.93 The  cycle  of  popular  uprisings  followed  by  state  repression  continued
throughout the 1920s (a report published by the Turkish Army Staff Headquarters listed
a total of thirteen separate rebellions in the period 1925-1930),94 culminating in a major
rebellion in  Ağrı  province  in  the  summer of  1930,  which  the Turkish military only
managed to put down with great difficulty.95
Yet popular opposition to the reforms was not limited to the country's eastern provinces.
By  1929,  the  state's  secularizing  and  Westernizing  reforms,  coupled  with  the
deteriorating economic conditons brought on by the Great Depression,  were causing
increasing  discontent  throughout  the  country.96 In  response,  in  June  1930,  Mustafa
Kemal sanctioned the establishment of the Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası (Free Republican
Party, FPP), intended as a loyal opposition party that would provide a safe outlet for
popular discontent. Yet the party's criticism of the government's economic policies, as
well as its call for a reversal of some of the more radical Westernizing reforms proved
hugely and, for the Turkish leadership, unexpectedly popular.  The party's leader, Ali
Fethi, was met by large crowds wherever he went, and his visit to Izmir in September
was accompanied by demonstrations,  strikes and attacks  on the party offices  of  the
RPP.97 Caught off-guard by the level of popular support enjoyed by the FPP, Mustafa
Kemal dissolved the party in November 1930.98
An incident which occured a month later in the western Anatolian town of Menemen
proved equally shocking for the Turkish leadership. In what would become known as
the “Menemen Incident,” a crowd gathered around a dervish named Mehmed, a member
of  the  outlawed  Nakşibendi  religious  brotherhood,  who  claimed  to  be  the  Mahdi
92 Martin van Bruinessen, Agha, Shaikh and State: The Social and Political Structures of Kurdistan (London: Zed 
Books, 1992), 298.
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94 Çağaptay, 21.
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96 Yılmaz Çolak, “Nationalism and the State in Turkey: Drawing the Boundaries of 'National Culture' in the 
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(Messiah) come to rid the world of evil.  When a gendarmerie reserve officer (i.e. a
representative of the Turkish state) attempted to disperse the gathering, he was seized by
the crowd, beheaded, and his head was paraded around the town on a flagpole.99 This
incident was particularly alarming for the secular republican elites because it took  place
in one of the most developed (and therefore supposedly “civilized”) provinces of the
republic. Their alarm is well captured in the response of the writer Yakup Kadri to the
incident: “[I]t is as though nothing has happened all these years, as though ... the idea of
any of our radical reforms has not altered anything in this country.”100 The incident was
thus interpreted to mean that the Westernizing reforms had not taken root among the
majority of the population, and that religious backwardness was alive and well.
The Ağrı uprising, the failed FPP experiment, and the Menemen incident, all occuring
during what Çagaptay has described as “the troublesome [year] 1930,”101 convinced the
Turkish leadership that their attempts to mould the citizens of the Turkish Republic into
a cohesive Turkish nation, and to secularize and Westernize Turkish society, had not had
the desired success. These events lent an added urgency to the elaboration of a new
ideology  intended  to  legitimize  their  own  rule,  as  well  as  the  reforms  they  were
undertaking.  This  ideology,  “Kemalism,”  was  officially  launched  at  the  third  party
congress of the RPP in 1931. Central to this ideology was the development of a state-
centred Turkish nationalism which, so the Kemalist ideologues hoped, would  fill the
“legitimacy vacuum” left by the abolition of the Ottoman Sultanate and the Caliphate –
that is, the two pillars on which the legitimacy of the late Ottoman state had rested.102
Further, they hoped that the new nationalism would serve as the foundation for a new
civic religion centred on the Turkish nation and the Turkish Republic,  which would
replace the central role of Islam in Turkish society.103 
99 Ibid., 60.
100 Quoted in ibid., 60.
101 Çağaptay, 41.
102 Hanioğlu, Atatürk, 160-161.
103 Ibid., 160-161. 
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CHAPTER 2
THE NEW NATIONAL HISTORIOGRAPHY
A core part of the creation of the new Kemalist ideology was the elaboration of a new
history  of the Turkish nation. This chapter will provide a short account of the writing of
the new national history, before placing this history in its historiographical context.
2.1. Writing the New National History
On 26 April 1930, at the behest of Mustafa Kemal, the young history teacher Afet İnan
gave a speech at the sixth general assembly of the nationalist  Türk Ocakları  (Turkish
Hearths) organization, in which she called for the “true” history of the Turkish nation to
be written.  Generations  of  Turks,  she claimed,  had been taught  a  faulty and partial
version of their own history. This faulty understanding of the past needed to be rectified
and the glorious history of the Turks uncovered, so that the Turkish Republic's citizens
might “walk along the luminous path of Turkish history toward the bright horizons of
the future.”104 Following İnan's  speech and a  couple of others in a similar  vein,  the
assembly voted to establish the Türk Tarih Tetkik Heyeti (Committee for the Research of
Turkish History), charged with “studying and examining Turkish history and civilization
in  a  scientific  manner.”105 A year  later,  the  Türk  Ocakları  were  dissolved,  and  the
committee,  having changed its  name to  Türk Tarih Tetkik  Cemiyeti  (Society for  the
Research of Turkish History), came under the direct control of the state.106
The  Türk  Tarih  Tetkik  Cemiyeti  took the  place  of  another  state-controlled  historical
association, the Türk Tarih Encümeni (Turkish History Council), which dissolved itself
104 The speech is reproduced in Uluğ İğdemir, Cumhuriyetin 50. Yılında Türk Tarih Kurumu (Ankara: Türk Tarih 
Kurumu Basımevi, 1973). Translation my own.
105 Ibid., 4. 
106 Copeaux, 40.
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at the end of the year 1931.107 The Türk Tarih Encümeni itself had been founded under
the name Tarih-i Osmanî Encümeni (Ottoman History Council) by Sultan Mehmed V in
the year 1909, and charged with writing a general history of the Ottoman Empire.108
While it was only moderately successful in this regard – only the first volume of the
general history was ever published, in 1917109 – the council also published a number of
monographs110 and a bi-monthly journal,  Tarih-i Osmanî Encümeni Mecmuası, which
mostly contained articles  on Ottoman history.111 After  the foundation of the Turkish
Republic, the council came under the control of the ministry of education, and its name
was changed to  Türk Tarih Encümeni.112 Yet  despite  the name change,  the council's
publications  during  the  1920s  had  continued  to  mostly  focus  on  the  history  of  the
Ottoman Empire.113
Both the fact that it was an originally Ottoman institution, and that its area of research
was almost exclusively limited to the Ottoman past,  counted against the  Türk Tarih
Encümeni  in  the  eyes  of  the  republican  leadership.114 Yet,  so  Hasan  Akbayrak  has
argued, it was the background of the council's members that eventually convinced the
leaders of the Turkish Republic of the need to replace the council with the  Türk Tarih
Tetkik Cemiyeti. Most of the members of the  Türk Tarih Encümeni  were professional
historians, and as such, Akbayrak claims, not amenable to writing the ideologically and
politically inspired historical narrative which the Turkish leadership had in mind.  They
thus needed to be replaced by people who would have no professional qualms about
constructing such a narrative.115
This argument is supported by the background of the founding members of the  Türk
Tarih Tetkik Heyeti. The committtee was headed by Mehmet Tevfik (Bıyıklıoğlu), who
was also the general secretary of the office of the president of the Turkish Republic. The
107 Akbayrak, 340.
108 Ibid., 49.
109 Ibid., 95.
110 Ibid., 86.
111 Ibid., 104.
112 Ibid., 253.
113 Ibid., 272.
114 Ibid., 355-356.
115 Ibid., 357.
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two assistant chairmen were Yusuf Akçura, the RPP member of parliament for Istanbul,
and  Samih  Rıfat,  the  RPP member  of  parliament  for  Çanakkale,  while  its  general
secretary, Reşit Galip, was the RPP member of parliament for Aydın. All of the other ten
founding members were either RPP members of parliament or at least party members.116
Büşra Ersanlı has described these founding members of the committee as “politicians-
historians,” taking on a “triple responsability:  they were leading nationalists, leading
party members,  and also made up the cadre spearheading the rewriting of  [Turkish]
history.”117
The political nature of the project to create a new Turkish national history is further
highlighted  by the  central  involvement  of  Mustafa  Kemal  himself.118 In  Afet  Inan's
account, it was Mustafa Kemal who had first charged her with finding a new approach
to  Turkish  history.119 It  was  also Mustafa  Kemal  who,  in  1929,  had  tasked selected
members  of  the  Türk  Ocakları  with  preparing  the  rough  draft  of  a  new  national
history120 and, once they had formed the Türk Tarih Tetkik Heyeti, urged them to publish
their findings in book form as quickly as possible.121 Mustafa Kemal even contributed to
the writing of a chapter on the origins of Islam that would appear in one of the history
textbooks published in 1931.122
The first work produced by the Türk Tarih Tetkik Heyeti was Türk Tarihinin Ana Hatları
(Outlines of Turkish History), published towards the end of the year 1930.123 The book's
printrun was limited to 100 copies, and while its general approach to Turkish history
met with official approval, it  was criticised for the number of flagrant mistakes and
omissions it contained.124 Nevertheless, a simplified version of the history outlined in
116 Ersanlı Behar, İktidar ve Tarih, 95. For the full list of members, see İğdemir, 4-5.
117 Ersanlı Behar, İktidar ve Tarih, 93. Translation my own.
118 Hanioğlu has described the new historiography as one of Mustafa Kemal's “pet projects.” Hanioğlu, Atatürk, 
180.
119 Afet İnan, “Atatürk ve Tarih Tezi,” Belleten 10 (1939), 244.
120 Uluğ İğdemir, Cumhuriyetin 50. Yılında Türk Tarih Kurumu (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1973), 3.
121 Ersanlı Behar, İktidar ve Tarih, 102-103.
122 Hanioğlu, Atatürk, 131-132.
123 Türk Ocağı Türk Tarihi Heyeti, Türk Tarihin Ana Hatlar. (Istanbul: Devlet Matbaası, 1930). Reprinted by Türk 
Tarih Kurumu (Ankara, 2014). All subsequent page references will be to the 2014 edition. 
124 Behar, İktidar ve Tarih, 103.
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the Ana Hatları was prepared and distributed to schools as a supplementary textbook.125
The following year,  the  Türk Tarihi Tetkik Heyeti,  having changed its name to  Türk
Tarih  Tetkik  Cemiyeti,  published  a  series  of  four  history  textbooks  for  use  in  the
country's secondary schools (lise), based on the historiographical outline developed in
Türk Tarihin Ana Hatları.  These books would form the basis of history education in
Turkish schools throughout the 1930s. It was only in 1939, a year after the death of
Mustafa  Kemal,  that  the  decision  to  remove  them from the  syllabus  was  taken,  a
decision implemented in the year 1941 (Tarih IV continued to figure on the high school
syllabus until 1944).126 At a combined length of nearly 1400 pages, they may be seen as
the  fullest,  most  complete  expression  of  the  Kemalist  version  of  Turkish  national
history.
2.2. The Historiographical Background
It  is  important  to  note  that  the  new  national  history  was  not  created  in  a
historiographical vacuum. Rather, it was shaped by a number of historiographical trends
that had emerged in the final decades of the Ottoman Empire. This section will therefore
provide a short overview of these new historiographical trends.
Among other things, the Tanzimat reforms of the mid-19th century created, arguably for
the first time in Ottoman history, a public sphere.127 The creation of this public sphere,
the  printing  of  a  number  of  earlier  Ottoman  chronicles  that  had  previously  only
circulated in manuscript form, and the wider availability of works on the history of the
Ottoman  Empire  written  by European  scholars  (most  notably Joseph  von Hammer-
Purgstall's  monumental  Geschichte  des  Osmanischen  Reiches)  led  to  a  greater
engagement  with  the  Ottoman  past  than  had  previously  been  possible.128 Unlike
Ottoman historians of earlier centuries, whose works usually took the form of linear
125 Türk Tarihin Ana Hatları – Methal Kısmı (Istanbul: Devlet Matbaası, 1931).
126 Aslan, “Devrim Tarihi Ders Kitaplari,” 298.
127 Gürpınar, Ottoman/Turkish Visions of the Nation, 14.
128 Ibid., 24-26.
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chronicles of important events,129 19th-century Ottoman historians, motivated – like the
Tanzimat  reformers  –  by a  desire  to  improve the  functioning of  the  Ottoman state,
adopted a more analytical and critical approach to the Ottoman past.130 Many of the
histories  of  the  Ottoman Empire  written  in  the  19th  century focused on what  their
authors  saw as  the  factors  behind the  decline  of  the  empire  –  be  they institutional
weaknesses,  reactionary  social  forces,  or  corruption  among  the  ruling  elite  –  and
advocated reform as the only way to ensure the empire's survival.131
Works dealing with Ottoman history would continue to be published during the final
decades of the empire and the early years of the Turkish Republic, but the Ottoman past
was gradually marginalized as a subject of historical study, due to a growing interest in
the history of the pre-Ottoman Turkic states and societies of Central Asia. This growing
interest can be traced to developments in European scholarship. Thus, from the late 19th
century onwards  a  growing number of  European Orientalists  had begun to dedicate
themselves to  the study of the culture,  language and history of  the Turkic-speaking
peoples of Central Asia, encouraged by major archaeological discoveries in the area.132
The  most  significant  of  these  finds  were  the  Orhon  inscriptions,  which  had  been
discovered in what is today Mongolia in 1887 and dated to the early 8th century CE.
These inscriptions constituted the first known written example of a Turkic language, and
provided important information about the history and culture of the society that had
created them.133
Inspired by the increasing amount of research into the past of the Central Asian Turkic
peoples, a number of European authors developed more or less fanciful theories about
the  historical  origins  of  the  Turkish  nation.  Two  authors  in  particular  were  very
influential in this regard. The first was Mustafa Celâleddin Paşa, a Polish convert to
Islam, who in 1869 published the book Les Turcs anciens et modernes. In  this book, he
traced  the  origins  of  the  Turks  to  a  pre-historic  Central  Asian  homeland.  He  also
129 Behar, İktidar ve Tarih, 43.
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claimed  that  the  ancient  Anatolian  Hittites  and  Mesopotamian  Sumerians  had  been
Turkish, and that Turks had been the founders of Rome and Roman civilization, basing
the latter claim on his supposed discovery of important similarities between Latin and
the Turkic languages.134 Another scholar, the Frenchman Leon Cahun, made a similar
claim in a presentation he gave to the First Orientalist Congress in Paris in 1873. In his
speech, he postulated that in prehistoric times the Turks had lived around a Central
Asian  inland  sea,  and  that,  after  this  sea  had  dried  up,  they  had  begun  migrating
outwards and settling in various regions of Eurasia,  from northern Europe to north-
eastern Asia.135 In the 1896 work Introduction à l'histoire de l'Asie, Cahun reiterated his
thesis. Basing himself on the deciphered text of the Orhon inscriptions, he also made
claims about the high civilizational level of Turkish society, which, so he claimed, was
characterized by a strong sense of justice, equality between men and women, and a high
degree of organization.136
The theories of Leon Cahun and Mustafa Celâleddin,  as well  as the more scientific
findings  of  other  European scholars  regarding the  Central  Asian  Turkic  past,  had  a
considerable influence on Ottoman intellectuals of the time, and led a number of them
to publish their own works on the history of the pre-Ottoman Turks. In 1886, Mizancı
Mehmed Murad, a prominent journalist and future leading member of the Young Turks,
published a universal history textbook in which he claimed that the Turks were one of
the  three  great  nations  of  Asia,  along  with  the  Indians  and the  Chinese.137 Another
prominent  journalist,  Ahmed  Midhat,  published  the  work  Mufassal  Tarih-i  Kurun-ı
Cedide (History of Modern Times) in 1887. This book asserted the Turkish ancestry of
the  Ottomans,  as  well  as  providing  an  account  of  pre-Ottoman  Turkish  history.138
Finally, Necip Asım, “the first Turkish Turkologist,”139 published the general Turkish
history book Türk Tarihi in 1900. Based to a large part on the theories of Leon Cahun,
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this work also contained a detailed account of the various pre-Ottoman Turkish Islamic
dynasties.140
Necip Asim's highly influential work stressed the antiquity of the Turkish nation, the
high  level  of  civilization  it  had  achieved,  and  its  role  in  promoting  the  spread  of
civilization to other nations. According to Asim, Turks had  helped to carry the ideas of
the Persians, Chinese and Arabs beyond the political boundaries of these nations, as
well as creating a civilization of their own, contemporaneous with the civilizations of
ancient Rome and Greece, but free of many of the vices that had afflicted them. 141 Turks
had also supposedly been an integral  part  of  Islamic civilization,  helping  to  defend
Islam against the Crusader armies and contributing to the development of science and
art in the Islamic world.142
These  Ottoman  authors'  stress  on  the  constructive  contribution  of  the  Turks  to  the
development of human civilization needs also to be understood in the context of the
growing hostility of  European public  opinion toward the Turks from the late  1870s
onward,  mostly  in  response  to  accounts  of  Ottoman  atrocities  in  putting  down  a
Bulgarian uprising in 1876. In European discourse, Turks were increasingly portrayed
as a barbaric, uncultured and destructive force.143 Arguing against such a portrayal, the
Ottoman historians emphasized the civilized nature of the Turkish nation, even going so
far as to describe the Turks as civilizationally superior to the Europeans. Thus Necip
Asim claimed, in an article written for the Turkist newspaper İkdam in 1895, that at the
time when the Turks had created the Orhon inscriptions, the Europeans were as yet
unable to read or write.144
The number of associations researching the culture and history of the Turkish nation
140 Kushner, 30.
141 Ibid., 31-32.
142 Ibid., 33-36.
143 Copeaux, 15. A typical example of this discourse can be found in a pamphlet penned by the British Liberal 
politician William Gladstone in 1876: “The Turks [...] are the one great anti-human species of humanity. 
Wherever they went a broad line of blood marked the track behind them, and, as far as their dominion reached, 
civilization vanished from view.” Quoted in Murat Kaya, “Western Interventions and Formation of the Young 
Turks' Siege Mentality,” Middle East Critique 23:2 (2014), 127.
144 Copeaux, 24.
31
increased greatly in the aftermath of the 1908 constitutional revolution.145 The main
centre  for  research  into  the  pre-Ottoman  history  of  the  Turks  in  the  Second
Constitutional  Era  (1908-1918)  was  the  Turkist  organization  Türk  Ocağı  (Turkish
Hearth), established in 1912 with the aim of, as the prominent Turkist Tekin Alp put it,
“advancing national education, raising the scientific, societal and economic standards of
the Turks, who are the most distinguished of the Islamic peoples, and developing the
Turkish race and Turkish religion.”146 To this end, the members of the Türk Ocağı aimed
to study the histories and cultures of the various Turkic-speaking peoples. Among the
organization's founding members were leading Ottoman Turkists and emigré Turkists
from the  Russian  Empire,  most  prominently  Ahmed  Ağaoğlu  and  Yusuf  Akçura.147
Through their journal Türk Yurdu (Turkish Homeland), these intellectuals contributed to
the further dissemination of Turkist  thought among the late Ottoman reading public.
Based on their belief that the Turkic peoples all belonged to the same nation, a number
of Türk Ocağı members also advocated pan-Turkism, calling for the political union of
all these peoples in a single state. Key members of the CUP government, most notably
Enver  Paşa,  the  minister  of  war,  subscribed to  this  ideology,  and pan-Turkism to a
certain extent determined the policies of the Ottoman Empire during the First World
War.148 Forced to give up its political advocacy of Turkism, Türk Ocağı (renamed Türk
Ocakları) would nevertheless continue as a cultural association during the early years of
the republic149 until its dissolution in 1931. 
Perhaps the most influential member of  Türk Ocağı was Ziya Gökalp, a largely self-
taught intellectual and sociologist. In his most famous work, Türkçülüğün Esasları (The
Foundations of Turkism), published in 1923, Gökalp offered a defining account of the
Turkist view of history. Gökalp claimed that the Turks, whom he defined as a nation
sharing a common culture and language, had played a dominant and continuous role in
the history of Eurasia, having, since the time of the Huns, established a large number of
united and highly organized states in the steppes of Central Asia. All of these states
145 Behar, İktidar ve Tarih, 78-79.
146 Quoted in ibid., 84. Translation my own.
147 Yusuf Akçura would be, as we have seen, one of the founding members of the Türk Tarih Tetkik Cemiyeti.
148 Jacob M. Landau, Pan-Turkism: From Irredentism to Cooperation (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana 
University Press, 1995), 51-55.
149 Akbayrak, 305.
32
ruled over societies notable for their tolerance, their “international morality” (Gökalp's
version of the Enlightenment's “universal civilization”) and their “feminist” character.150
Gökalp's  views, and those of his  fellow Turkist  intellectuals,  would have a defining
impact on Kemalist historiography.
A second approach to  the  history of  the  Turkish  nation  emerged in  the  late  1910s.
Adapting to  the loss of the Ottoman Empire's  remaining European provinces in  the
Balkan  wars,  which  made  Anatolia  the  heartland  of  what  was  left  of  the  Ottoman
Empire,  and  rejecting  the  pan-Turkist  project,  a  number  of  prominent  Ottoman
historians in this period began to explore the historical connection between the Turks
and Anatolia,  constructing  Anatolia,  rather  than  the  Central  Asian  highlands,  as  the
homeland of the Turkish nation.151 In the context of the failure of the empire's pan-
Turkist  policies  during  the First  World War,  the  decision  by leaders  of  the  national
resistance movement that the Turkish nation state would be confined to the geography
of Anatolia,152 and the rival claims of Greeks, Armenians and Kurds on Anatolia, the
need to establish a historical connection between the Turkish nation and Anatolia began
to acquire an even greater importance.153
Central to this narrative was the Seljuk Sultanate of Rum,154 the Anatolian offshoot of
the  great  Central  Asian  empire  established by the  nomadic  Seljuk  tribe  in  the  11th
century. The Rum Sultanate had been established in the aftermath of the 1071 Battle of
Manzikert,  in which a Seljuk army defeated an army led by the Byzantine Emperor
Romanos, opening the way for the Turkic Seljuks to move into Anatolia. In 1918, the
noted historian Fuad Köprülü, a pioneer of the study of Seljuk history as an important
aspect of the history of the Turkish nation155 and a future member of the  Türk Tarih
150 For this summary, see Copeaux, 27.
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Tetkik  Cemiyeti,156 described  the  battle  and  its  aftermath  as  follows:  “Completely
defeating the Roman emperor Romanos Diogenes in the Battle of Manzikert, [the Seljuk
commander Alparslan] ... established absolute Turkish rule in Anatolia.”157 Manzikert
thus came to be seen as the foundation of a Turkish Anatolia, and the Anatolian Seljuk
Sultanate as the first  in an unbroken line of Anatolian Turkish states that  would be
continued by the beyliks (fiefdoms) which came to dominate Anatolia as the Sultanate
began to weaken, the Ottoman state and, finally, the Turkish Republic.158
A second  strand  in  this  construction  of  Anatolia  as  the  Turkish  national  homeland
emphasized the extent to which Anatolia had supposedly determined the character of the
Turkish nation. In this view, the Turkish nation only became constituted as such once
the Seljuks had settled in Anatolia.  Out of the mixture of the Seljuks' Central Asian
warrior  nature  and  Islamic  belief,  and  the  traditions  and  culture  of  the  Anatolian
villagers emerged a Turkish nation tied to the Anatolian soil. “It was Manzikert that
made the Turks and not vice versa.”159 In an extension of this interpretation, a number of
late Ottoman and early republican intellectuals constructed the Anatolian peasant, due to
his  daily  contact  with  the  land,  as  the  main  carrier  of  Turkish  national  culture
throughout the history of Turkish Anatolia.160 The pure, uncorrupted Turkishness of the
Anatolian  peasant  was  juxtaposed  with  the  degenerate  cosmopolitanism  that  had
supposedly  corrupted  the  ideas  and  morals  of  the  Istanbul-  and  Rumelian-based
intellectual  and political  elite.161 Thus,  for  example,  in an attack on Ziya  Gökalp (a
native of the Anatolian city of Diyarbakir) published in 1923, the intellectual Ziyaeddin
Fahrı  claimed  that  Gökalp's  originally  pure  Turkish  nationalist  thought  had  been
corrupted  by his exposure to the foetid intellectual atmosphere and political passions of
early 20th-century Salonica.162
156 Ibid., 379.
157 Quoted in Gürpınar, Ottoman/Turkish Visions of the Nation, 123.
158 Ibid., 124.
159 Ibid., 122.
160 Ibid., 113.
161 Doğan Gürpinar, “From the Bare and Arid Hills to Anatolia, the Lovable and Beautiful: Kemalist Project of 
“National Modernity” in Anatolian Countryside,” Middle Eastern Studies 48:6 (2012), 907.
162 Seçil Deren, “Türk Siyasal Düşüncesinde Anadolu İmgesi,” in Modern Türkiye'de Siyasî Düşünce: Milliyetcilik, 
ed. Tanıl Bora (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2003), 535.
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Kemalist  historiography as  expressed  in  the  Tarih  textbooks  would  reflect  both  the
critical approach to Ottoman history that had begun to develop during the Tanzimat and
had gathered pace during the Second Constitutional Era, and the two approaches to the
history of the Turkish nation outlined above. It  would thus stress the Central  Asian
origins and civilizing role of the Turks, as well as the importance of Anatolia as the
Turkish national homeland and the role of the Anatolian folk as the carrier of Turkish
national  culture.  This  will  become clear  in  the  analysis  of  the  textbooks'  historical
narrative, which is the subject of the following chapter.
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CHAPTER 3 
BETWEEN TURKISH NATIONALISM AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION: AN
ANALYSIS OF THE TARIH TEXTBOOKS
3.1. An Overview of the New Historical Narrative
Before going on to a more detailed analysis of the Tarih textbooks, I would here like to
provide  a  brief  overview of  Turkish  national  history as  presented  in  the  textbooks,
focusing on each of the Tarih volumes in turn.
According to the textbook authors, Turkish national history could be traced a long way
into the past. A highly developed, settled and recognizably Turkish civilization had, they
asserted, existed along the shores of a vast Central Asian inland sea as long ago as 10
000 BCE. When climatic changes brought on by the end of the last ice age had caused
this inland sea to dry up, the Turks were forced to set out in search of new homelands,
taking their  civilization with them. These  Turkish migrations  were  shown to be the
catalyst  for  the  emergence  of  civilization  throughout  ancient  Eurasia.  Turks  had
supposedly settled throughout the Eurasian world, founding the first civilized societies
in  China and  India.  The  ancient  Sumerians and,  crucially,  the  Hittite,  Phrygian  and
Lydian civilizations in Anatolia were also claimed as Turkish. Turks had not, however,
merely founded their own civilizations, they had also spread civilization among other
peoples. The development of the civilizations of ancient Egypt, Greece and Rome had
thus supposedly been stimulated by these ancient Turkish migrants. The history of the
original  Turkish  civilization  in  Central  Asia,  of  the  Turkish  migrations,  and  of  the
ancient civilizations that emerged as a result of these migrations was recounted in Tarih
I, the first volume of the new history textbooks.
According to the new historiography, not all Turks emigrated from the Central Asian
homeland. Some of them stayed behind and adopted a nomadic existence more suited to
the changed environmental conditions. Over the coming millenia, these nomads would
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establish  a  number  of  powerful  Turkish  states  on  the  Asian  continent,  including  –
among others – a Turkish Hunnic empire claimed to have existed in Central Asia during
the first millenium BCE, the medieval Anatolian Seljuk state, and the Indian Mughal
Empire. The history of these states formed one strand of the narrative in the second
volume of the history textbooks, Tarih II. The second strand of this textbook's narrative
was formed by an account of the emergence and spread of Islam. In this account, the
Arabs were relegated to a minor, supporting role. Rather, it was the Turks who were
shown to have been the driving force behind the spread of Islam and the flowering of
Islamic science and culture.
The  Tarih  textbooks presented  the  Ottoman  Empire  as  the  last  (bar  the  Turkish
Republic) of the states created by the Turkish nation. The Kemalist historians dedicated
one entire textbook volume, Tarih III, to an account of the empire's history. This account
is notably more negative than the textbooks' triumphant depiction of the earlier Turkish
states. Following a brief and glorious golden age in the 15th and early 16th centuries,
Ottoman  history  was  presented  as  a  story  of  continuous  decline,  caused  by  the
degeneration  and  corruption  of  the  Ottoman  state,  constant  wars  against  various
European powers, the reactionary influence of Islam, and the empire's  cosmopolitan
nature.  This  account  of  Ottoman  history  was  juxtaposed  to  an  account  of
contemporaneous developments in Europe. The final textbook in the series,  Tarih IV,
offered  an  account  of  the  Turkish  National  Struggle,  the  abolition  of  the  Ottoman
Empire and the founding of the Turkish Republic, and of the reforms undertaken by the
Turkish leadership during the 1920s, presenting these developments as a restoration of
the glorious pre-Ottoman Turkish past.
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3.2. The Turkish Nation and the Turkish National Homeland
3.2.1. Creating the Turkish Nation: Race and Language
One main aim of the new historiography was the creation of a cohesive Turkish nation,
corresponding as closely as possible to the population of the Turkish Republic, and the
definition of which would not rely on Islam as a marker of national belonging. With
these aims in mind, the Kemalist historians created a vision of a primordial Turkish
community,  whose  origins  they  traced  to  Central  Asia,  and  whose  modern-day
representatives, so they claimed, were the Turks living in the Turkish Republic. This
ancient community had supposedly already had all the characteristics of a nation in the
modern  sense:  “The  Turkish  race,  having  throughout  history  demonstrated  an  eye-
catching desire for unity, is at the same time also a community that corresponds in the
closest possible way to the concept of the nation as it is defined today.”163
Yet as this extract also makes clear, the textbook authors viewed the Turkish nation as
congruent  with  the  Turkish  race.  How,  then,  did  they  define  the  concept  of  race?
According  to  the  textbooks,  ancient  mankind  was  divided  into  a  number  of  races.
Membership of a given race was based on descent, and races were distinguished by
various  physical  features  –  skin  colour,  height  and  head  shape  being  the  most
prominent. “Race is the unity exhibited by people descended from the same blood and
sharing the same physical features.”164 Within this framework, the Turks were described
as a white, brachycephalic (“short-headed”) race.165
Büşra Ersanlı has noted that this view of the ancient Turkish nation as a distinct race
was clearly inspired by race theories that had gained a wide currency in late 19th and
early 20th-century Europe.  Specifically,  she cites the influence of  Eugene Pittard,  a
Swiss  anthropologist  known  for  his  anthropometrical  research,  and  of  the  French
163 “... tarihte daima göze çarpar bir birlik arzeden Türk ırkı ... aynı zamanda bugünkü millet tarifine de en uygun 
büyük bir cemiyettir.” Tarih I, 20.
164 “Irk, aynı kandan gelen ve cismen biribirine benziyen insanların gösterdiği birliktir.” Ibid., 18.
165 Ibid., 16-18.
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aristocrat Arthur de Gobineau, one of the founders of modern racism.166 In his 1856
Essai sur l'inégalité des races humaines, de Gobineau had postulated the existence of
three separate human races – white, yellow and black – and the natural superiority of the
white race over the other two.167 For de Gobineau, the ancient Turks of Central Asia had
belonged to the yellow race.168 Mustafa Kemal had read de Gobineau's essay169 and,
according to the Kemalist historian Afet Inan's oft-cited anecdote, the characterization
of the Turks as a yellow race was one of the catalysts for the creation of the new Turkish
national history. In the year 1928, after she had shown him a French geography textbook
in which the Turks were described as a secondary,  yellow race, Mustafa Kemal had
responded:  “No,  that  is  not  possible,  we should  look into  this.  Get  to  work.”170 By
depicting the Turks as a  white  race,  the Kemalist  historians thus hoped to undercut
European discourses of Turkish racial inferiority.
The authors of the Tarih textbooks went even further. While the Turkish nation could, so
they claimed, trace its origins to the dawn of human civilization, and had been able to
preserve its racial distinctness throughout history,171 the same could not be said of the
European nations. Unlike the Turkish nation, the European nations did not correspond
to any particular race, but had been created out of a mixture of various different races.172
The  origins  of  the  European  nations  were  also  supposedly  very recent,  neither  the
French nor the German nation having begun to constitute itself as such before the late
Middle Ages.173 The Turkish nation was thus both much older than the European nations
and, according to the logic of racist theorists such as de Gobineau, who posited that
racial mingling led to a decline in the quality of the human stock,174 superior to them.
166 Ersanlı, 109.
167 Gregory Blue, “Gobineau on China: Race Theory, the “Yellow Peril,” and the Critique of Modernity,” Journal of
World History 10:1 (2001), 100.
168 Arthur de Gobineau, The Inequality of Human Races, trans. Adrian Collins (London: William Heinemann, 1915),
128.
169 Hanioğlu, Atatürk, 166.
170 İnan, 244.
171 “... Türk ırkı benliğini en çok muhafaza etmiş bir ırktır.” Tarih I, 20.
172 “Filhakika, bugünkü  Avrupanın büyük millet kütleleri doğrudan doğruya bir ırka mensup olmadıkları gibi, bu 
cemiyetlerin ekserisinde bariz vasıflarını muhafaza etmiş hâkim bir ırk ta mevcut değildir. Bu milletler muhtelif 
ırkların muhtelif nispetteki tesalüplerinden husule gelmiş yeni birer heyettirler.” Ibid., 19.
173 The Tarih II textbook described the aftermath of the division of Charlemagne's Empire among his sons as 
follows: “Bu tarihteki (843) taksime rağmen her kısma düşen ahalinin ayrı ayrı birer millet haline gelebilmeleri 
için, bundan sora daha çok asırlar geçmiştir.” Tarih II, 200.
174 Blue, 102.
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Yet the textbook's creation of a congruence between the Turkish nation and the Turkish
race  was  not  solely  designed  to  prove  the  racial  superiority  of  the  Turks  over  the
Europeans.  It  was  also  a  way  of  merging  the  Muslim  inhabitants  of  the  Turkish
Republic into a single nation – without actually making any reference to Islam. In this
context,  the  textbook's  emphasis  on  language  as  an  indicator  of  racial  belonging
becomes important.
Thus, according to the Tarih I textbook, physical features were not the sole indicator of
race. An equally important indicator was language, which was described as a product
both of the environment a society inhabited, and of the racially determined biological
features shared by members of this society. In this way, language was clearly linked to
race.175 The authors identified four main Eurasian language families  – Turkic, Indo-
European, Semitic and Mongoloid – which corresponded roughly to the main Eurasian
races. Native speakers of the Turkic languages were, then, racially Turkish.176
The textbook went on to claim that, while the Turks had been able to preserve their
racial distinctness, and thus their language and culture, better than any other race, a few
groups among them, having lived for long periods among other peoples, had forgotten
their language and cultural identity.177 This argument was applied most prominently to
the Anatolian Kurds. In the  Tarih IV account of the Sheikh Said rebellion, the rebels
were described as “pure” Turks. However, due to the provocations of foreign powers
and  the  policies  of  the  Ottoman  Empire,  they  had  supposedly  forgotten  their  own
(Turkish) language and culture, and had come to see themselves as separate from the
Turkish nation. As a result of this, they were now making demands for independence
from the Turkish Republic.178
175 “Dimağın en kıymetli mahsulü olan dil bilhassa Türk ırkının büyük ekseriyetinde tarihî devirlerin husule 
getirdiği tekâmül silsilesi içinde daima ana hatlarını muhafaza etmiştir. Tarihtenevelki zamanlarda ve tarihî 
devirlerde ayrı ayrı cemiyetler, medeniyetler, devletler vücuda getirmiş olan bu büyük ırk mensupları, kuvvetli 
dimağlarının muhtelif muhitlerde yarattığı müşterek dil ve harslarla ve irsî vasıflarile uzun veya kısa müddetler 
zarfında biribirinden daima müteessir olmuşlardır.” Tarih I, 20.
176 Ibid., 18-19.
177 “Ancak uzun devirlerde ve büyük ekseriyetler içinde ihtilâtlara maruz kalanları temessül edip isimlerini ve 
dillerini muhafaza edememişlerdir.” Ibid., 20.
178 “Asılları en saf türklük kökünden geldiği halde asırlardanberi hariçten giren siyasî tahrikler ve saltanat 
idaresinin fena siyasetleri yüzünden bir kısmı kendilerini türklükten ayrı saymağa başlamış olan şark vilâyetleri 
Türkleri ...” Tarih IV, 192.
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If the Kurds were actually Turks who had simply “forgotten” their  Turkish identity,
there was no reason for the Turkish state to grant them national independence or even
autonomy. Rather, they would have to be re-assimilated into the Turkish nation. It is in
this context that the notion of language as a key marker of racial/national belonging
became important. If race and nation were tied to language, forcing the Kurds to speak
Turkish would allow them to (re)join the Turkish national fold. In this way, the concept
of  race  outlined  in  the  textbooks  provided  a  theoretical  justification  for  the  forced
assimilation measures employed by the state against the Kurds in the late 1920s and
1930s, namely the prohibition of the Kurdish language and the Turkification of Kurdish
place and personal names.179 Thus, Soner Çağaptay has argued, the conception of race
outlined in Kemalist historiography was inclusive, rather than exclusive. By focusing on
language as the main marker of racial belonging, and equating the concepts of race and
nation, the Kemalist historians created a way for the Kurds to become not just Turkish
citizens, but members of the Turkish nation.180
Çağaptay actually goes further, arguing that the Kemalists expected even non-Muslims
to become assimilated into the Turkish nation in this way, a position that seems to be
supported by the definition of the term “Turk” adopted at the RPP's 1931 congress:
“Every individual residing inside the Turkish Republic who speaks Turkish, has been
brought up with Turkish culture, and has accepted the Turkish ideal is a Turk, regardless
of  his/her  religion.”181 Yet,  reflecting  the  anti-Christian  bias  of  Turkish  nationalism
discussed in the first chapter of this thesis,182 no claim regarding the Turkishness of the
republic's Jewish or Christian minorities was made in the  Tarih  textbooks. In practice
also, as had been the case during the 1920s, the Turkish state's policies towards the Jews
and  Christians  during  the  1930s  (and  after)  aimed  more  at  segregation  than
integration.183 What this suggests is that, in the textbooks, the concept of race as the
marker of belonging to the Turkish nation served as a “scientific” replacement for a
179 Üngör, 30.
180 Çağaptay, 97-98.
181 “Türkiye Cümhuriyeti dahilinde Türk dili ile konuşan, Türk kültürü ile yetişen, Türk mefkûresini benimsiyen her 
fert, hangi dinden olursa olsun Türktür.” Quoted in Tarih IV, 182.
182 This bias is also reflected in the Tarih II account of the conversion of a number of Turkish tribes to Christianity 
during the Middle Ages, which, in the eyes of the authors, made them lose their Turkishness: “Roma Papalarının
bütün Avrupa âlemini propaganda ile hıristiyan yapmak hususunda aldıkları tedbirler ve gösterdikleri meharet 
ve faaliyetler hayrete şayandır. Bu suretle birçok kavimlerin hıristiyanlığı kabul etmeleri suretile Türk âlemi 
milyonlarca ırkdaşını kaybetmiş oldu.” Tarih II, 78. 
41
marker which had been prominently employed during the Second Constitutional Era
and the National Struggle: Islam.
3.2.2. Anatolia: the Turkish National Homeland
In  addition  to  creating  a  Turkish  nation  out  of  the  Turkish  Republic's  Muslim
inhabitants, the textbook authors also had to establish that nation's historical right to the
territory controlled by the Turkish Republic. They did this by constructing a historical
link between the Turkish nation and Anatolia, which in the Kemalist narrative became
the national “homeland protected by the Turks”184 -  in contrast  to the Central  Asian
anayurt, or “original homeland.”185
Here, it is important to note that the correspondence between the territory of the Turkish
Republic and the geographical area described as Anatolia was an innovation of the early
republic. During the Ottoman period, Anatolia had not included the eastern provinces of
Erzurum, Van, Diyarbakır or Hakkari, which were inhabited mostly by Armenians and
Kurds, and which the Sèvres Treaty of 1920 had accorded to prospective Armenian and
Kurdish states. Following the establishment of the republic, Turkish geographers came
up with a variety of geographical classifications which extended the geographical entity
referred to as Anatolia so as to include these provinces, and thus to create as close a
congruence as possible between this term and the territory controlled by the Turkish
Republic. This process would culminate in the definition, adopted at the 1941 Turkish
Geography Congress, of the eastern provinces as “Eastern Anatolia” (Doğu Anadolu). In
this way, the territory of the Turkish Republic was turned into a coherent, indivisible
geographical unit.186
183 See, for example, Hatice Bayraktar, “The anti-Jewish pogrom in Eastern Thrace in 1934: new 
evidence for the responsibility of the Turkish government,” Patterns of Prejudice 40:2 (2006), 95-
111; Ayhan Aktar, ““Tax me to the end of my life!:” Anatomy of an anti-minority tax legislation 
(1942-43),” in State-nationalisms in the Ottoman Empire, Greece and Turkey, ed. Benjamin C. Fortna
et al. (London: Routledge, 2013), 188-220; Ali Tuna Kuyucu, “Ethno-religious 'unmixing' of 'Turkey':
6-7 September riots as a case in Turkish nationalism,” Nations and Nationalism 11:3 (2005), 361-380.
184 “... Türkün barındığı öz yurdu Anadolu ...” Tarih IV, 15.
185 Tarih I, 26.
186 Gürpınar, “From the Bare and Arid Hills,” 908-909.
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The historical  claim of  the  Turkish nation  to  Anatolia  was clearly expressed in  the
definition of Turkish national homeland contained in the 1931 program of the RPP:
“The national homeland is the land of the Turkish nation within our current political
borders,  which  the  Turkish  nation  has  occupied  throughout  its  ancient  and  exalted
history,  leaving its remains buried in the depths of the earth.”187 The “remains” here
referred to the archaeological remains left behind by the Hittites, an ancient people who
had established an empire in Anatolia in the mid-second millenium BCE. The Tarih I
textbook, adopting a thesis that had first been propagated by Mustafa Celâleddin Paşa in
the late 19th century,  and reprised by the Turkist intellectual Ahmed Ağaoğlu in the
introduction to the 1922 work Pontus Meselesi, claimed that the Hittites had belonged to
the Turkish nation.188 Like many other groups of Turks, they had supposedly emigrated
from the anayurt after the Central Asian inland sea had dried up, and had finally settled
in Anatolia. Here, they had established a number of states which were eventually united
into the Hittite Empire.
The claim that  the  Hittites  were  Turks  went  against  existing  European scholarship,
which had found (in 1915) that the Hittite language was an Indo-European, not a Turkic
tongue.189 The textbook authors' peculiarly defensive insistence that “The languages of
the Hittites ... were Turkic languages. The language of the Hittites is not a Semitic or
Indo-European language.”190 suggests that they were aware of this fact. Yet the claim
that the Hittites belonged to the Turkish nation suited the nation-building motives of the
Kemalist historians. By Turkifying the Hittites, they could argue that Turks had been the
first inhabitants of Anatolia, and that the Turkish presence there predated that of either
Greeks or Armenians.191 The Turks thus had a greater claim to Anatolia than either of
these other nations.
The Tarih I textbook also Turkified the Phrygian and Lydian states which rose in central
and  western  Anatolia  after  the  collapse  of  the  Hittite  Empire  in  the  late  second
187 “Vatan Türk Milletinin eski ve yüksek tarihi ve topraklarının derinliklerinde mevcudiyetlerini muhafaza eden 
eserleri ile yaşadığı bugünkü siyasî sınırlarımız içindeki yurttur.” Quoted in Tarih IV, 179.  
188 Tarih I, 128.
189 Can Erimtan, “Hittites, Ottomans and Turks: Ağaoğlu Ahmed Bey and the Kemalist Construction of 
Turkish Nationhood in Anatolia,” Anatolian Studies 58 (2008), 157.
190 “Etilerin esas dilleri ... türkçe asıldandır. Etilerin dili samî veya Hint-Avrupalı değildir.” Tarih I, 128.
191 Gürpınar, “From the Bare and Arid Hills,” 920.
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millenium BCE. Yet once these states had collapsed in their turn, around 500 BCE, the
focus of the narrative shifted away from Anatolia, with the following 1500 years of
Anatolian history barely rating a mention. The history of the Byzantine Empire, which
dominated Anatolia for much of the first millenium CE, was accorded a mere six pages,
of which three pages were given over exclusively to an account of the 6th-century reign
of  the  emperor  Justinian.192 Meanwhile,  while  Tarih  II did  contain  some  passing
references  to  the  presence  of  Armenians  in  Anatolia,193 neither  of  the  two  major
medieval  Armenian states in  Anatolia – the Bagratid  Kingdom and the Kingdom of
Cilicia – was accorded a separate chapter, or even a separate paragraph in the textbook's
account of Anatolian history.
Anatolia only took centre stage again with the arrival of the Seljuks. Drawing on the
historical narrative that had been developed during the late 1910s and 1920s by Fuad
Köprülü in particular,194 the textbook argued that the victory of the Seljuks at the battle
of Manzikert in 1071 left Anatolia open to the Turks.195 With the establishment  of an
independent Anatolian Seljuk Empire (Anadolu Selçuk İmparatorluğu)  by the Seljuk
commander Suleiman in 1077, a “Turkish unity in Anatolia”196 was supposedly created.
Yet  the  establishment  of  the  Anatolian  Seljuk  state  did  not  merely  mean  Turkish
political overlordship over Anatolia. The textbook also claimed that the Seljuk invasion
entailed a Turkification of the Anatolian population. Thus, the existing urban and rural
population of Anatolia had supposedly been decimated as a result of the near-continuous
wars between the Byzantine Empire and its eastern neighbours – first the Umayyads,
then the Abbasids and finally the Seljuks. This meant that the Turks who migrated to
Anatolia as a result  of the Seljuk victory at  Manzikert  quickly came to constitute a
majority of the Anatolian population.197 As most of these migrants were Muslims, this
also meant the Islamization of Anatolian society.198 
192 Tarih II, 39-43.
193 Ibid., 226-227, 229, 233, 235, 268, 272.
194 Gürpınar, Ottoman/Turkish Visions of the Nation, 110.
195 “... bütün Anadolu Türkler karşısında adeta müdafaasız kalmıştı.” Tarih II, 227.
196 “... Anadoluda Türk vahdeti ...” Ibid., 229.
197 “Bizanslıların Emeviler ve Abbasilerle, daha sora Selçuklularla mütemadi harpleri, Anadoluyu harap etmişti. 
Anadoluda Selçuk Devleti kurulduğu zaman, şehirler harap, ahaliden mahrum, tarlalar bakımsız ve metruk bir 
halde idi. Şarktan mütemadi gelen Türk kütleleri, Anadoludaki nüfus kesafetini yeniden çoğalttı.” Ibid., 282.
198 “Selçuklarla beraber Anadoluya gelen Türk kütleleri hemen umumiyetle müslüman idiler, binaenaleyh 
müslümanlık Anadoluda hâkim din oldu.” Ibid., 283.
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Under the small Anatolian beyliks  which began to emerge and expand along with the
gradual  disintegration of  the Anatolian Seljuk state  in the 13th century,  the Turkish
language also supposedly gained greater prominence, not just as the language of the
people, but as the language of literature and government (in which fields the Persian
language had previously been dominant). The Tarih II  textbook described this process
as follows: “During the 14th century, as the Seljuk state, whose palace life had been
unduly shaped by Iranian culture, was replaced by independent beyliks in different parts
of Anatolia, the Turkish language gained greatly in importance...By the end of the 14th
century,  the  Turkish  language  had  ended  the  dominance  of  foreign  languages  in
Anatolia.”199 
According  to  the  textbook  account,  Anatolia  was  thus  politically,  ethnically,
linguistically and religiously Turkified during the era of the Anatolian Seljuk sultanate
and of its successor states. This laid the basis for the supposedly continuing Turkish
dominance over Anatolia, even after the disintegration of the Seljuk state: “After the
Seljuk sultanate in Anatolia crumbled and fell apart,  the Turkish nation founded the
more  powerful  Ottoman  Empire;  after  the  Ottoman Empire  itself  was  consigned  to
history, the Turks decided to found another, even more powerful, national and modern
state carrying their own name”200 - the Turkish Republic.
The textbook narrative thus created a dual Turkish claim to Anatolia. The Turks (as
Hittites)  had been the original settlers  of Anatolian soil,  and therefore had a greater
claim to Anatolia than either the Greeks or the Armenians,201 rendering any putative
irredentist  ambitions  which these nations might  have on the territory of the Turkish
Republic  illegitimate.  The  ancient  Turkish  claim to  Anatolia  was  reinforced  by the
account of the Turkification of Anatolia under the Seljuks, and by the textbooks' almost
complete silence regarding the historical existence of non-Turkish states or peoples on
Anatolian soil. The impression given is of a continuous, and dominant, Turkish presence
199 “XIV. asırda, saraylarında İran kültürüne fazla mevki veren Selçuk Devleti yerine Anadolunun muhtelif 
yerlerinde müstakil beyliklerin kurulması, Türk diline büyük bir ehemmiyet verdirdi ... türkçe XIV. asır sonunda 
Anadoluda yabancı dillerin hakimliğine nihayet vermiştir.” Ibid., 287.
200 “Anadoluda Selçuk Saltanatı yıkılıp dağılınca, ondan daha kuvvetli Osmanlı Saltanatını kuran millet, Osmanlı 
Saltanatı tarihe karışırken de, ondan daha kuvvetli başka bir devlet, kendi adını taşıyan millî ve muasır bir 
devlet kurmıya azmetmişti.” Tarih IV, 14.
201 Copeaux, 31.
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in  Anatolia,  from  antiquity  until  the  founding  of  the  Turkish  Republic,  which
legitimized the creation of a Turkish nation state on this territory.
3.3. The Turkish Nation and Civilization
3.3.1. The Turks as the Founders of World Civilization
The aim of  the new Turkish national  historiography was not  only the creation of  a
coherent Turkish nation and of a Turkish national homeland in Anatolia. The Kemalist
historians also needed to legitimize the Westernizing reforms of the Turkish leadership
and its attempts to make Turkey part of the West. They did this by elaborating what
Hanioğlu has termed “an extravagantly flamboyant theory”202 designed to prove that a)
civilization was Turkish in origin, and that b) Turkish civilization, even in its ancient
form, bore many of the hallmarks of Western modernity.
According to this theory, the ur-Turks in the Central Asian  anayurt  had developed a
sophisticated, sedentary, agrarian civilization while humans in other parts of the world
were  still  stuck  in  a  primitive,  nomadic,  hunter-gatherer  way  of  life.203 Migrating
outward from their homeland and settling in other parts of Eurasia, the Turks took their
civilization  with  them.  These  migrations  were   shown  to  be  behind  the  spread  of
civilization  throughout  the  ancient  world:  “In  search  of  better  climes,  the  Turks,
carrying  the  seeds  of  their  civilization,  migrated  outwards  in  all  directions;  they
searched for fertile plains and rich water sources that would be suitable for agriculture.
When they encountered primitive natives, they either drove them out or, by mingling
with  them,  civilized  them.”204 In  this  way,  Turks  supposedly brought  civilization  to
202 Hanioğlu, 59.
203 “Dünyanın başka taraflarında, insanlar, daha kaya ve ağaç koruklarında en koyu vahşet hayatı yaşarken Türk, 
Anayurdunda kereste, maden medeniyetleri devirlerine kadar ulaşmıştı. İnsanlıkla hayvanlığı hakikî ve bariz 
surette ayıran devir, hayvanları ehlileştirme devri, en evel burada açılmış; tabiati insan iradesine boyun 
iğdirerek işletmenin ilk merhalesi sayabileceğimiz çiftçilik, burada başlamıştır.” Tarih I, 26.
204 “Daha eyi iklimler aramağa çıkan Türkler ... medeniyetlerinin tohumlarile birlikte dört bucağa yayıldılar; 
çiftçiliğe yarıyacak güzel ovalar, zengin su boyları aradılar. Karşılaştıkları iptidaî yerlilerle çarpışarak onları ya
başka yerlere sürdüler, ya da içlerine girerek temdin ettiler.” Ibid., 28.
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China, India, Egypt, Mesopotamia and Anatolia; that is to say, to all the civilizational
centres of the ancient Eurasian world.
This theory is very similar to 19th-century European theories claiming that a single
people  –  the  Indo-Europeans  –  had  spread  civilization  across  ancient  Eurasia.  The
existence of the Indo-Europeans (or Indo-Aryans – the term had not yet acquired the
stigma of association with Nazi ideology) had first been posited in the late 18th century,
after the English scholar Sir William Jones had discovered striking similarities between
Sanskrit,  Latin,  ancient  Greek and Persian,  and the Germanic and Celtic  languages.
These  similarities,  he  argued,  could  only  be  explained  by  the  fact  that  all  these
languages derived from a common source,205 which later studies located in the steppes
of  southern  Russia.  Successive  outward  migrations  of  tribes  living  in  this  area  had
supposedly spread the shared language of these tribes across Eurasia, and the various
languages belonging to the Indo-European family had evolved out of this ur-language.
Under  the  influence  of   19th-century  race  theories  and  assumptions  regarding  the
civilizational superiority of the Europeans, these Indo-Europeans came to be seen not as
a loose federation of tribes spreading a common linguistic heritage, but as members of a
single race sowing the seeds of civilization across ancient Eurasia. Thus Friedrich Max
Müller,  a  professor  of  Sanskrit  at  Oxford  University,  had  in  the  mid-19th  century
described the Indo-Europeans as “the masters of history,” endowed with a “mission to
link all parts of the world together by chains of civilization, commerce and religion.”206
Possibly inspired by such claims, Samih Rıfat,  a bureaucrat in the late Ottoman and
early republican administrations and after 1923 an RPP member of parliament, had in
the 1920s propounded a theory whereby the Turks were the oldest race in the world,
originating in Central Asia, and from there had spread their language and civilization
across Eurasia, a claim he intended to prove by demonstrating the Turkish ancestry of
the Eurasian languages.207 Widely ridiculed,  even in Turkish nationalist  circles,  Rıfat
nevertheless assumed an important position in the  Türk Tarihi Tetkik Heyeti  upon the
205 John Keay, India: A History (London: HarperCollins, 2000), 20.
206 Quoted in ibid., 21.
207 İlker Aytürk, “Turkish Linguists Against the West: The Origins of Linguistic Nationalism in Atatürk's Turkey,” 
Middle Eastern Studies 40:6 (2004), 13.
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committee's  establishment  in  1930,  and  was  thus  prominently  involved  in  the
elaboration of the new historiography.208
Tarih I acknowledged the existence of the Indo-Europeans, but located their origins in
north-eastern Europe, on the shores of the Baltic Sea. From here, they textbook authors
claimed, the Indo-Europeans (a tribal federation, rather than a race) had migrated south-
and westward,  occupying modern-day Germany,  France,  Spain,  Italy and the British
Isles, and forcing the local populations to adopt their language.209 The influence of the
Indo-Europeans was thus contained within Europe,  and any connection between the
Indo-Europeans  and  the  civilizations  of  ancient  Anatolia,  Persia,210 and  India211 was
strenuously denied.  In  Kemalist  historiography,  the  honour  of  civilizing  the  ancient
Eurasian world belonged exclusively to the Turks.
Northern China,  being closest  to the Turkish  anayurt,  was,  according to the  Tarih I
textbook,  the first region to be civilized by the Turks, who supposedly arrived there
around 5000 BCE, bringing with them agriculture and civilization212 and establishing a
ruling class over the local population.213 The Turks also brought civilization to India,
invading the subcontinent from the north, pushing the local, dark-skinned population
southward, and establishing the civilizational centres of Harappa and Mohenjo-Daro,214
whose remains archeologists had discovered a few years prior to the writing of the Tarih
textbooks, and dated to the mid-fourth millenium BCE.215 A second wave of invaders,
who began to  settle  the  Indian  north in  the  mid-second millenium BCE,  were  also
claimed as Turks, a clear rejection of 19th-century European scholarship, which had
determined that these ancient settlers had been a branch of the Indo-Europeans.216
208 Ibid., 15.
209 Tarih I, 259.
210 “Avrupalıların İran ve Arî kelimesi üzerindeki telâkki ve taksimleri tamamile yanlıştır.” Ibid., 164.
211 “Hindistan, M. E. 1500 tarihlerinde şimalden, Pencap üzerinden yeni bir istilâya uğradı. Ortaasyadan gelen bu 
istilâcılara Avrupa âlimleri Hint Arileri derlerse de bunlar hakikatte yurtlarından ayrılmış Türk kabileleridir.” 
Ibid., 75.
212 Ibid., 28.
213 Ibid., 56.
214 Ibid., 29.
215 Keay, India, 12.
216 Ibid., 21.
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Another  Turkish  migratory  wave  supposedly  brought  civilization  to  Anatolia,
Mesopotamia and Egypt.  As we have already seen, Kemalist  historiography claimed
that the Hittite civilization was founded by Turks who had migrated westward. But these
would-be  Hittites  did  not  migrate  on their  own –  they were accompanied  by other
Turkish tribes, who would go on to establish the civilizations of Sumer,  Akkad and
Elam in  Mesopotamia.217 Other  Turks  supposedly  laid  the  foundations  of  Egyptian
civilization,  even if the later development of that civilization was attributed to local
Semitic tribes.218 Turks were also claimed to be the authors of Minoan and Mycenean
civilization, having migrated west across the Aegean Sea from Anatolia.219
3.3.2. Defining Turkish Civilization: Sumer and the Hittites
Both  the  Tarih  I  textbook  and  its  precursor,  Türk  Tarihin  Ana  Hatları, devoted  a
significant amount of space to accounts of the political history of Sumer and the Hittite
state, and to a description of their respective societies and cultures.220 What is interesting
about  this  description  is  that  it  was  framed  in  terms  designed  to  underline  the
civilizational modernity of these societies. This emerges most clearly in the textbooks'
portrayal of the social position of Hittite and Sumerian women. Thus, Türk Tarihin Ana
Hatları claimed that Hittite women enjoyed a high position in society – they  took part
in the running of the state, pronounced judgments, and even went to war.221 Sumerian
women, meanwhile, lived in monogamous union (this union, the authors emphasized,
was  not  a  religious  institution)  with  their  husbands,  had  an  equal  claim  to  family
property, could work in any profession they chose, and walked the streets with their
faces uncovered.222 Moreover, girls were allowed to attend the same schools as boys,
where  they  took  classes  in  reading  and  writing,  grammar,  construction,  geography,
217 Tarih I, 87.
218 Ibid., 108.
219 Ibid., 191-192.
220 Based on the notion that these states were both formed by participants in the same Turkish migratory movement, 
the textbooks claimed that they shared many of the same characteristics. See Türk Tarihin Ana Hatları, 174.
221 “Etilerde kadın hürriyeti yüksekti. Bunlar hükümet işlerinde vazife aldıktan başka, hâkimlik de yaparlar ve 
erkekler gibi muharebelere giderlerdi.” Türk Tarihin Ana Hatları, 172.
222 “Sumerlerde aile teşkilâtı tek zevce (monogamie) esası üzerine müessesti. İzdivaç, dinî bir mahiyette değildi ... 
İzdivaçtan sora kadın, aile mallarında ve mülklerinde müşterekti ... Kadın iktisadî bir istiklâle sahipti, istediği işi
tutabilirdi; tezgâhlarda, mağazalarda çalışır, yüzü açık olarak gezerdi.” Tarih I, 97.
49
mathematics, measurements and literature.223 This commitment to secular education and
learning was in keeping, so the textbook authors averred, with the Sumerians' positivist
approach to knowledge.224
This view of Sumerian and Hittite society was based to a certain extent on Western
scholarship. Thus the claim that Hittite women participated in warfare may be traced to
the  1884  work  The  Empire  of  the  Hittites  by  the  Presbyterian  missionary  William
Wright, which contained the claim that the Amazon warriors of Greek legend had in fact
been Hittite priestesses.225 Similarly, the archaeologist Leonard Woolley,  whose 1929
work  The Sumerians was listed among the sources for  Türk Tarihin Ana Hatları, had
noted that Sumerian marriages were monogamous, and that the wife   had joint control
over her dowry (if not over the entire family property) with her husband.226 Woolley also
noted that women could independently engage in business,227 while both boys and girls
could attend school, where they learned grammar, mathematics and measures.228 The
claim that Sumerian women walked the streets  uncovered,  meanwhile,  was possibly
based on Sumerian statues of women with their hair and face unveiled.229
Yet I would argue that this  portrayal of the Sumerian and Hittite societies was also
shaped by the Kemalist leadership's view of Western modernity and by the concepts
which they considered to be integral to this modernity: secularism, equality between the
sexes, the participation of women in public life, and a positivist approach to knowledge.
Turkish  civilization  as  it  appeared  in  its  Sumerian  and  Hittite  incarnations  was
inherently and precociously Western: it was Western before the West. In this context, the
references  to  the  absence  of  female  veiling  and  the  existence  of  secular,  mixed
education  are  particular  interesting,  suggesting  that  “real”  Turkish  civilization  was
223 “Sumerlerin talim ve terbiye teşkilâtı mükemmeldi. Erkek ve kız çocukları bir arada tahsil ederlerdi. 
Mekteplerde okuma yazma, gramer, inşa, coğrafya, riyazıye, mesaha usulleri, mikyaslar ve edebiyat öğretilirdi.” 
Ibid., 97.
224 “Sumerlerin fikirlerinin filî tezahürleri tetkik olunursa müspet bir felsefeye salik oldukları anlaşılır.” Ibid., 97.
225 William Wright, The Empire of the Hittites (London: James Nibet & Co., 1884), 74. Wright's work was one of 
the main sources used by the Turkist intellectual Ahmed Ağaoğlu in composing the introduction to the 1922 
work Pontus Meselesi, which popularized the notion that the Hittites had been Turks. See Erimtan, 157.
226 C. Leonard Woolley, The Sumerians (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1928), 100.
227 Ibid., 101.
228 Ibid., 108-110.
229 Ibid., facing page 164.
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opposed to two institutions fundamentally associated with Islam (and thus also with the
“backward”  East):  the  veil  and  the  medrese.  The  Kemalist  secularizing  and
Westernizing reforms could then be portrayed as a return to the original civilization of
the Turks.
3.3.3. Civilizing Europe: Ionians, Phocaeans and Etruscans
Having  Turkified  the  population  and  civilization  of  ancient  Anatolia,  the  textbook
authors went on to argue that the seeds of civilization were brought to Europe by three
peoples  from  the  western  region  of  Anatolia:  the  Ionians,  the  Phocaeans  and  the
Etruscans. The Ionians, an ancient people based on the Anatolian Aegean coast, and one
of the main contributors to the flowering of ancient Greek civilization, became, in the
Kemalist  version of  history,  a Turkish tribe.  Migrating westward from Anatolia,  the
Ionians supposedly settled on the Greek peninsula, where they spread their civilization
among the local population,230 themselves the descendants of earlier Turkish migrants.231
Over the following centuries, these Turkish inhabitants of the Greek peninsula would
supposedly mingle with a number of other races, producing the Greek nation that the
Romans were familiar with.232
The Kemalist  historians  also Turkified the Phocaeans,  a  branch of  the  Ionians  that,
around 600 BCE, had established a trading outpost in what is now the city of Marseille
on  the  French  Mediterranean  coast.  From this  outpost,  they  supposedly  spread  the
rudiments of civilization among the local population: “It was the Phocaeans who taught
the people of France the alphabet and the use of money.”233 Finally, the textbooks also
claimed  the  Etruscans  as  Turkish,  arguing  that  they  were  related  to  the  Anatolian
Lydians, and endowed with a culture that was superior to that of any contemporary
European people,  including the  Greeks.234 According to  this  account,  the  Etruscans,
230 Tarih I, 200.
231 Ibid., 185.
232 Ibid., 186.
233 “Fransa ahalisine alfabeyi ve para kullanmasını öğreten Foçalılardır.” Ibid., 200.
234 “Diğer hiçbir Avrupalı millet hars itibarile [Etrüsklere] muadil değildi ... Mimarlıkta kemer ve kubbe yapmasını 
bilirlerdi ki o zaman Grekler bilmiyorlardı.” Ibid., 265.
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having crossed the Eastern Mediterranean, established a sophisticated civilization on the
Italian peninsula and founded the city of Rome. Roman civilization, while not Etruscan
(i.e. Turkish) itself, would be raised on the foundations created by the Etruscans.235
While  the  origins  of  the  civilization  of  the  ancient  Greeks  and  Romans  –  and,  by
implication, also the origins of Western civilization – were clearly claimed as Turkish in
the textbooks, neither the Greek, nor – more obviously – the Roman polities were thus
Turkified quite as comprehensively as those created by the Hittites and Sumerians. To a
large extent, as Wendy Shaw has suggested, this seems to have been simply a matter of
expediency: the Sumerian language had not been classified at the time the textbooks
were written, and it was thus relatively easy to claim a Turkish origin for this language
and thus for the people who spoke it.236 A similar thing held true for the Hittites: while
the Hittite language had been deciphered and classified as Indo-European in 1915, the
study of  Hittite  civilization  was  still  in  its  infancy,  which  made  the  claim that  the
Hittites were Turks somewhat less controversial – particularly as Western archaeologist
frequently drew parallels between the customs and dress of the Hittites and those of the
modern-day  inhabitants  of  Anatolia.237 Conversely,  both  ancient  Rome  and  ancient
Greece had been studied in great detail by Western scholars, and it was consequently
much harder to rewrite their history so as to make these polities completely Turkish.
Yet I would suggest that the partial Turkification of the Greek and Roman polities also
foreshadowed another  aspect  of  the  Kemalist  historical  narrative  that  becomes  very
prominent in the textbook account of the two millenia following the birth of Christ. This
is the division of Eurasian history into the history of two distinct entities: Europe and
Asia. This division will be analyzed in the following section. 
235 Ibid., 268.
236 Wendy M.K. Shaw, “Whose Hittites, and Why? Language, Archaeology and the Quest for the Original Turks,” in
Archaeology under Dictatorship, ed. Michael L. Galaty et al. (New York: Springer, 2004), 135.
237 Ibid., 137.
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3.4. Asia and Europe
The Kemalist division of Eurasia into the distinct spheres of Europe and Asia can be
traced to the ideology of pan-Asianism. Pan-Asianism had first emerged in the 1880s,
both  in  response  to  the  realities  of  Western  imperialism,  and  to  the  increasingly
elaborate European (and US American) theorizing about the inherent superiority of the
“white,”  Christian  nations  over  Islam  and  the  “yellow  races”  of  Asia  which
accompanied  the  imperialist  enterprise.238 Pan-Asianism defined  Asia  as  a  cohesive
body in contradistinction to the European West. According to pan-Asianists, Asia had
long been militarily and civilizationally superior to Europe, but from about the 16th
century had begun to “fall behind” the West. It was this falling behind that had enabled
the Europeans to eventually subjugate much of the Asian continent.239 The Kemalist
historians adopted from pan-Asianism both the concept of Asia as a coherent block, and
the claim of Asian military and civilizational superiority over Europe prior to the 16th
century. Yet, in an idiosyncratic twist that was nevertheless wholly consistent with the
broader scope of the Kemalist historical narrative, they attributed both the coherence of
Asia and its superiority over Europe to the dominant role played by the Turkish nation
in the history of Asia.
3.4.1. Asia Turkified
The Kemalist historians invested a considerable amount of effort and ingenuity in order
to Turkify the history of Asia from the early first millenium CE until the 16th century.
Turks were shown to have built almost all of the great Asian states in this period, and to
have militarily and politically dominated the continent. This account also once again
underlined  the  inherent  civilizational  capabilities  of  the  Turks.  Just  as  Turks  had
supposedly spread civilization throughout the ancient world, so they were also shown to
be behind the various flowerings of civilization on the Asian continent in this period,
whether in Tang China, Mughal India, the Central Asian steppes or the Islamic Middle
238 Aydın, 7-8.
239 Eri Hotta, “Rash Behari Bose and his Japanese Supporters,” Interventions 8:1 (2006), 123-124.
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East. Kemalist historiography thus created a coherent Asian/Eastern civilizational block
– one whose civilization was shaped by the Turkish nation. The Turkification of Asian
history may be seen to consist of three separate steps: the Turkification of India and
China, the Turkification of the Central Asian steppe empires, and the Turkification of
Islam.  
3.4.1.1. China and India
As  we  saw  in  the  previous  section,  according  to  Kemalist  historiography  Turkish
migrants  from  Central  Asia  had  brought  civilization  to  China  and  India.  Turkish
involvement  in Chinese and Indian history did not  end there,  however.  Thus,  Turks
supposedly continued to shape Chinese civilization throughout the subsequent millenia:
Türk  Tarihin  Ana  Hatları argued  that  both  Confucius  and  Lao-Tzu,  the  founder  of
Taoism, were Turks.240 Turks, so  Tarih I claimed, also played a key role in shaping
Chinese political history. Thus the three great dynasties which dominated the history of
pre-imperial China – the Xia, the Shang, and the Zhou – were all supposedly of Turkish
origin.241 The same claim was made for Ying Zheng, the first man to unify the various
Chinese kindoms into a single state in 221 BCE (Ying Zheng was also, incidentally,
portrayed as a kind of proto-Atatürk, driving through a reform of the Chinese alphabet
in the face of strong opposition from the religious establishment).242 The Han dynasty
(206 BCE-220 CE), the Tang dynasty (618-907 CE), and the Yuan dynasty (1271-1368
CE) founded by the Mongol warlord Kublay Khan, were supposedly also Turkish.243
As  in  the  case  of  China,  Turkish  involvement  in  Indian  history  also  supposedly
continued long after the initial Turkish invasions of the subcontinent. A number of states
set  up  by  nomadic  invaders  in  northern  India  in  the  early  first  millenium  CE  –
specifically the Kushan empire and an Indo-Scythian state – were supposedly Turkish,244
240 Türk Tarihin Ana Hatları, 65. This claim is only implied, not made implicit, in Tarih I.
241 Tarih I, 57
242 Ibid, 58. The textbook even referred to the Chinese religious scholars who supposedly opposed the alphabet 
reform as ulema, a term usually reserved for Islamic religious scholars.
243 Türk Tarihin Ana Hatları, 77-88.
244 Tarih I, 77-78.
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as,  notably,  was  the  Buddha.245 The  textbooks  also  glorified  the  period  1001-1857,
during which a number of Muslim dynasties of Central Asian origin controlled parts of
northern  and  central  India,  as  the  great  age  of  Turkish-Indian  civilization.  This
civilization was shown to reach a high point under the early Mughal emperors – Babur
and Akbar in particular being singled out as avatars of Turkish greatness – and to only
have come to an end when the British forced Bahadur II, the last Mughal, to abdicate in
1857.246 In this way, the Kemalist historians created a version of Indian history that was,
like their version of Chinese history, fundamentally shaped and dominated by the Turks.
Of the three nations – Indian, Chinese and Turkish – which the Young Turk journalist
and historian Mizancı Mehmed Murad had described as the great nations of Asia in
1886, only one remained in the Kemalist version of Asian history: the Turkish nation.
3.4.1.2. Central Asia
The  Kemalist  historians  also  laid  claim  to  almost  all  of  the  ancient  and  medieval
nomadic polities of the Central Asian steppes. These polities, so they asserted, had all
been founded by descendents of the Turks who had stayed behind in the  anayurt  and
had adopted a nomadic existence more suited to the changed climatic conditions.247 The
polities claimed as Turkish by the Kemalist historians included the Asian Huns,248 the
Scythians, the Avars, the Hunnic confederation which, under Attila and his successors,
overran much of Europe, the White Huns (Akhunlar),249 the Gökturk confederation and
its  various  successor  states,  the  Bulgars  and  the  Khazars.  States  founded  by  later
Muslim Central Asian dynasties – the Karakhanids, the Khwarezmids, the Seljuks and
the Timurids – were also appropriated as part of the history of the Turkish nation.250
245 Ibid., 76.
246 Tarih II, 294-295.
247 Tarih I, 39
248 The textbooks' term for the Hsiung-nu (Tarih I, 63), a Central Asian nomadic federation which threatened the 
western borders of the Chinese states from the third century BCE to the first century CE. Chinese sources traced 
the origins of the Hsiung-nu back to remote antiquity, allowing the Tarih authors to claim a late second 
millenium BCE origin for the “Asian Hunnic Turkish Empire” (Asya'da Hun Türk İmparatorluğu). See Ying-
Shih Yü, “The Hsiung-nu,” in The Cambridge History of Early Inner Asia, ed. Denis Sinor (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1990), 118.
249 The textbooks' term for the Hephthalites (Tarih II, 28), a Central Asian tribe described by the Byzantine historian
Procopius as “the only ones among the Huns who have white bodies and countenances which are not ugly.” 
Quoted in Denis Sinor, “The Hun Period,” in The Cambridge History, ed. Sinor, 202.
250 Tarih I, 40.
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Interestingly, the textbook account was more ambiguous regarding the origins of the
Mongols, seemingly unable to decide whether this greatest of the Central Asian steppe
empires  should  be  claimed  as  a  Turkish  state  or  not. Thus,  the  Mongols  were  not
described as racially Turkish, but Turks were claimed to have played a central role in the
civilizational development of the Mongol Empire251 and of its successor states, most
notably  the  Golden Horde.252 In  this  way,  the  textbook  authors  avoided  racially
associating the Turks with the Mongols, who, in European racist frameworks, were seen
as representatives of  the yellow race.253
In  describing  the  later  historical  Central  Asian  states  and  societies  as  Turkish,  the
textbook narrative was largely in accordance with contemporary scholarship. Thus, in a
series of lectures on the history of the Central Asian Turks held at Istanbul University's
Institute  of  Turcology  in  1926,  the  noted  Russian  orientalist  Vasilii  Barthold  had
covered  the  history  of  the  Göktürks,  the  Uyghurs,  the  Bulgars,  the  Seljuks,  the
Karakhanids, the Khwarezmids and the Timurids.254 What was more controversial was
the textbooks' Turkification of the earlier Central Asian nomadic societies, particularly
the Scythians, the Hsiung-nu and the Huns. European scholars had established that the
Scythians  were  an Indo-European people  and probably spoke a  language related  to
ancient Persian,255 while a dearth of archaeological and linguistic evidence meant that no
consensus existed (or exists) regarding the origins or even the language of the Hsiung-
nu256 or the Huns.257
I would argue that there are two reasons why the textbook authors chose to Turkify
these earlier Central Asian nomadic societies. First, it allowed them to suggest a degree
of historical  continuity between the supposed inhabitants  of  the pre-historic  Turkish
anayurt  and  the  later,  recognizably  Turkic,  societies  of  Central  Asia.  Second,  by
Turkifying the Huns in particular, the Kemalist historians were able to create a narrative
251 Tarih II, 260-261.
252 Ibid., 313.
253 See for example de Gobineau, 111.
254 G.L.M. Clauson, Rev. of  Orta Asia Türk Tarkhi Hakkında Dersler by V. Barthold, The Journal of the Royal 
Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland 4 (1928), 928-929.
255 Tamara Talbot Rice, The Scythians (London: Thames and Hudson, 1958), 38
256 Ying-Shih, 118
257 Sinor, 201
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of Turkish military superiority over the West that lasted for over a thousand years. Thus,
the Tarih I and II textbooks dwelled extensively on the military successes of the Huns
under Attila, whose European campaigns they portrayed as sowing fear and awe across
the continent,258 and who at one point supposedly ruled over all of Europe.259 By the time
of Timur a thousand years later, very little had supposedly changed: “In the time of
Timur, Europe was nothing but a province of Asia. Its cities were like villages and the
life of its inhabitants was marked by misery. When the great Timur, Khan of the Turks,
appeared on the threshold of Europe, the kings of Europe paid homage to him through
envoys and letters.”260 In contrast, the only major campaigns of the “West” against the
“East” prior to the late 15th century – the Crusades – were treated with considerable
disdain.  The  Anatolian  Seljuks  and  various  supposedly  Turkish  commanders  in  the
Levant (including, as we shall see below, the fabled Salahaddin Ayyubi) were shown to
have dealt comfortably with anything the Crusader armies could throw at them. The
Crusades' lack of impact was underscored by a table in Tarih II, in which the results of
the  six  out  of  the  eight  Crusades  were  listed  as  either  “nonexistent”  or  “not
important.”261
The incorporation of these Central  Asian states and societies into the history of the
Turkish nation also posed a problem, however.  Within the civilizational frameworks
then  common  in  European  scholarship,  nomadism  corresponded  to  a  lower
civilizationalstandard than that of the settled societies of Europe.262 In keeping with their
depiction of the Turkish nation as the carriers of universal civilization, the Kemalist
historians thus had to repudiate the European notion that the Central Asian nomads were
uncivilized barbarians. 
This repudiation was clearly expressed in the passages describing the civilization of the
various nomadic states. Thus, the Huns, whom European historians, “unable to put aside
the  painful  memories  of  [the  Hunnic  invasions],”  had  “for  centuries  described  as
258 “Avrupada hayatları at sırtında geçen cesur Hunlardan mürekkep Türk süvari ordularına karşı çıkabilecek 
hiçbir millet yoktu. Avrupa baştanbaşa korku ve dehşet içinde idi.” Ibid., 23.
259 “Attilâ, bütün Avrupaya hâkim bir vaziyet aldı.” Tarih I, 341.
260 “Timur zamanlarında ...  Avrupa, Asyanın bir ... vilâyetinden başka bir şey değildi. Orada şehirler, köylerden ve 
hayat, sefaletten ibaretti. Timur Avrupa eşiğinde göründüğü zaman, Avrupa kıralları, Türklerin Hakanı Büyük 
Timura mektuplar ve sefirlerle hürmetlerini takdim ettiler.” Tarih II, 301.
261 Ibid., 244.
262 Aytürk, 6.
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uncivilized and barbaric,” were in fact a civilized people,  with a strong literary and
theatrical tradition263 – a bold claim to make for what was an essentially oral culture
with an unknown language.264 Similarly, the Bulgar Turks had by the fifth century CE
supposedly reached a civilizational level that was incomparably higher than that of the
neighbouring Slavs, and it was only due to the influence of the Bulgars that the Slavs
were able to develop their  own civilization.265 The Gökturks,  meanwhile,  were both
heroic  and  humane,  did  not  take  any  pleasure  in  raping  and  pillaging,266 and  had
achieved  a  refinement  in  their  material  culture  that  was  equal  to  that  of  the
Byzantines.267 Finally, regarding the material artifacts left behind by the Uyghurs (the
successors of the Gökturks in Central Asia), the textbook authors quoted an (unnamed)
German archaeologist  who had approvingly noted that “The Turks can be rightfully
proud  of  the  beautiful  and  great  civilization  of  their  ancestors,  [who  were  able  to
produce these artifacts] at a time when such things did not exist in England, France or
Germany.”268
3.4.1.3. Islam
The  Tarih  II  textbook  also  Turkified  the  history  of  the  Islamic  world,  focusing
particularly on the Turkish role in the creation of various Islamic states and empires, and
on the contributions of Turks to Islamic civilization. However, the textbooks did not
only lay claim to the Central  Asian Muslim Turkic states which Turkists like Necip
Asim had long regarded as part of the history of the Turkish nation. They also claimed
three  other  major  centres  of  Islamic  civilization:  the  various  Muslim states  on  the
263 “Hunların şiddetli hücumlarının acı hatıralarını unutamayan Avrupa müverrihleri, onları asırlarca medeniyetsiz
ve barbar olarak tasvir ve tavsif etmişlerdir. Halbuki Hunların kendilerine mahsus irfan, san'at ve medeniyetleri 
vardı ... Hunlarda edebiyat müterakki idi ... Tiyatro edebiyatı da oldukça ileri idi.” Tarih II, 27.
264 Sinor, 201.
265 “[Bulgarların] Tuna'nın aşağı mecrasını zaptettikleri, birçok İslav kabilelerini hakimiyetleri altına aldıkları 
zaman, onlarla mukayese edilemiyecek kadar yüksek, müterakki bir medeniyet sahibi idiler ... cenup İslavları da 
ancak bu medeniyetin nüfuzu sayesinde inkişaf edebildiler.” Ibid., 66-67.
266 “Gök Türkler çok cengâver olmakla beraber, çok ta insaniyetli idiler. Meselâ Asurilerin ve sair bazı cengâver 
milletlerin zafer kitabelerinde göze çarpan “Kan dökmek ve çok adam öldürmek zevki” Türk kitabelerinden 
anlaşıldığına göre asla mevcut değildi.” Ibid., 49-50.
267 Ibid., 50.
268 ““Ingiltere, Fransa ve Alamanyada böyle şeyler yokken, güzel ve büyük bir medeniyet sahibi olan cetlerile 
Türkler hakkile iftihar edebilirler.”” Ibid., 59.
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Iberian  peninsula,  the  Abbasid  Caliphate,  and  the  empire  created  by  the  Ayyubid
dynasty in the Levant.
The  textbook  authors  claimed  the  Iberian  Muslim states  by  arguing  that  the  North
African Berbers who played a key role in the Muslim conquest of the Iberian peninsula
were racially Turkish.269 The key role of the Turks in the political history of the Abbasid
Caliphate, on the other hand, mostly came at the expense of prominent Persians. Thus
Abu Muslim, the Persian leader of the revolution that overthrew the Umayyads and
brought the Abbasids to power, in the textbooks became a Turk leading a Turkish army
“which also included Iranians.”270 The Persian Barmakid family,  a number of whose
male members rose to prominence as viziers to the early Abbasid caliphs and as the
boyhood teachers of the caliph Harun al-Rashid and his sons, was also Turkified, 271 as,
tenuously, were Harun's sons, the later caliphs Mamun and Mutasim – through their
supposedly Turkish mothers.272 The Ayyubid state, finally, was claimed for the Turks by
Turkifying  the  Ayyubid  dynasty's  founder,  the  12th-century  military  commander
Salahaddin Ayyubi.273
By Turkifying these Islamic polities, the textbook authors were able to emphasize the
contribution of Turks to the development of Islamic civilization. Thus, the civilizational
flowerings that took place on the Iberian peninsula under Muslim rule,274 and in the
Levant  under  the  Ayyubids,275 were  both  attributed  to  the  Turkish  nature  of  these
respective societies. More importantly, though, the authors sought to Turkify what is
often termed the Golden Age of Islamic civilization, whose onset coincided with the
early ascendancy of the Abbasid Caliphate.
269 Ibid., 133.
270 “Horasanlı Ebumüslim namında bir Türk genci ... İranlıların da iltihak ettiği kuvvetli bir Türk ordusu ile ... 
Abbasoğullarından “Ebulabbas Abdullah” ... halife ilân ettirdi.” Ibid., 148.
271 Ibid., 149.
272 Ibid., 151.
273 Ibid., 262. Thanks mostly to his sympathetic portrayal by Enlightenment authors such as Gotthold Lessing and 
Sir Walter Scott, and to the 1898 visit of Kaiser Wilhelm II to his tomb in Damascus, Salahaddin had by the early
20th century emerged as the Muslim hero par excellence. See Gürpınar, Ottoman/Turkish Visions of the Nation, 
87-88.
274 “Endülüs tarihi dahi ince bir tetkikten geçirildiği takdirde orada da bütün Avrupayı irşat eden yüksek medeniyet 
kurucularının ve ilim saçan büyük  âlimlerinin Şarktan giden Türk âlimleri ve Türk ırkından ... Berber-Hazarlar 
olduğu kolaylıkla anlaşılır.” Ibid., 164.
275 “Eyubbî Devletile, Mısır ve Suriyede medeniyet noktasından yeni bir devir açıldı ki, bu devre doğrudan doğruya 
Türk Devresi demek lâzımdır.” Ibid, 266.
59
The Turkification of Islamic civilization, like the claim that the Central Asian nomads
had possessed  a  high  level  of  civilization,  ran counter  to  the  majority  of  European
scholarship.  In contrast  to their  low opinion of nomadic civilization,  19th and early
20th-century European scholars did acknowledge the high level that Islamic civilization
had reached during  the  Islamic  Golden Age,  symbolized  by such individuals  as  al-
Biruni, al-Farabi or Ibn Sina. Yet in keeping with the dominant racial discourses of the
time, they attributed this to the supposedly overwhelming civilizational influence of the
(Indo-European) Persians.276 Perhaps the best-known expression of this interpretation
featured in Ernest Renan's 1883 speech at the Sorbonne, which has already been cited
above.277 In  this  speech,  Renan argued that  Persians,  not  Arabs  or  Turks,  had  been
behind the cultural and scientific efflorescence of the Islamic Golden Age, but that this
fact had long been obscured by the use of Arabic as the lingua franca of Islamic culture
and science, which he likened to the use of Latin in the Christian West. Just as Western
scholars  like  Francis  Bacon  or  Spinoza  wrote  their  treatises  in  Latin,  but  were
themselves ethnically English or Dutch, so Islamic scholars like al-Biruni or Ibn Sina
wrote their treatises in Arabic, but were in fact ethnically Persian.278
The textbook authors did not challenge this argument, but simply adapted it: “Poets,
historians, scientists and philosophers (Ferdowsi, al-Biruni, Ibn Sina...) were employed
at the palaces of the Turkish sultans of the period. As had become customary, they wrote
the majority of their works in Persian or Arabic. In a similar way, Latin was used in
Europe  at  the  time.”279 The  implication  is  clear:  these  leading  lights  of  Islamic
civilization were not Arabs, nor Persians, but Turks, a claim that was made even more
explicit elsewhere: “Al-Biruni was a Turk from Khwarezm. Ibn Sina was a Turk who
was born in the village of Afshine close to Bukhara.”280 The high civilization of the
Islamic Golden Age was thus turned into a predominantly Turkish civilization.
276 Gürpınar, Ottoman/Turkish Visions of the Nation, 89.
277 See page 17 above.
278 Gürpınar,  Ottoman/Turkish Visions of the Nation, 90-91.
279 “... şair, tarihçi, âlim ve filozoflar (Firdevsi, Elbiruni, İbnisina...) bu devrin Türk padişahlarının saraylarında 
yetişmişlerdir. Bunlar eserlerini ekseriya, âdet olduğu üzere, farisî ve arapça yazarlardı. Nitekim bu zamanlarda 
Avrupada da lâtince kullanılırdı.” Tarih II, 299-300.
280 “Eburreyhanibirunî Harzemli bir Türktür ... İbni Sina Buhara yakınında Afşine kariyesinde doğmuş bir Türktür.”
Ibid., 163.
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In this way, the Kemalist historians were able to emphatically claim a dominant role for
Turks in the development of Islamic civilization, whether as rulers, soldiers, artists or
scholars:  “Turks  accomplished  great  things  in  every  branch  of  Islamic  civilization,
without exception.”281 Yet the textbooks also stressed the fact that Islamic civilization
was not just Turkish, but superior to the contemporary civilization of the West, as the
textbook account of the technological, scientific and cultural transfers from the Islamic
world to Europe that began in the aftermath of the Crusades makes clear:
Windmills, which up to this time had been unknown to the Europeans, began to be
constructed after the Crusaders saw them in the East. The arbalest, the drum and
the trumpet became known in Europe in the same way. Aristocratic ladies began
to use scents and pomades. Lords began to decorate the hitherto bare walls of their
castles with worked copper plates and tapestries from the East. The Europeans
also learned about the great inventions of the compass, paper and gunpowder from
Turks in the East.282
By  Turkifying  Islamic  civilization,  the  textbook  authors  could  prove  that  Turkish
civilizational superiority vis-a-vis the West, whose beginnings could be traced to ancient
pre-history, continued until well into the second millenium CE. The pre-Ottoman Turks
were thus not only militarily, but also civilizationally superior to the West.
It is this, perhaps, that explains the somewhat surprising inclusion of the great age of
Islamic history as part of the Kemalist, secular history of the Turkish nation. One reason
for this, suggested also by Gürpınar, might be the continuing importance of Islam to the
national identity of the Turks.  Regardless of all Kemalist rhetoric to the contrary, Islam
(and its history) remained an integral part of Turkish national identity, and could thus
not easily be jettisoned.283 Yet the Turkification of Islamic history may also be seen to
result from the internal logic of the Kemalist historians'  creation of a Turkish Asian
civilizational block. In this  reading, the textbook authors'  attempt to Turkify Islamic
history mirrored their attempt to civilize the history of the Central Asian nomads: the
nomads  were  Asian  and Turkish  and therefore  needed  to  be  portrayed  as  civilized.
281 “Bilâistisna islam medeniyetinin her şubesinde Türklerin büyük hizmetleri oldu.” Ibid., 162-163.
282 “Avrupada o zamana kadar bilinmiyen yeldeğirmenleri Haçlıların, şarkta bunları görmelerinden sora yapıldı. 
Arbalet (oluklu ok), tambur, trampete şarkta görüldükten sora Avrupada tanındı. Asılzade hanımlar kokular ve 
pomatlar kullanmıya başladılar. Senyörlerin o zamana kadar çıplak olan şatolarındaki oda duvarları, işlenmiş 
bakır levhalar ve şark kumaşlarile süslendi ... Avrupalılar, büyük icatlardan olan pusulayı, kâğıdı ve top 
barutunu da şarkta Türklerden öğrendiler.” Tarih II, 243.
283 Gürpinar, Ottoman/Turkish Visions of the Nation, 84.
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Islam, on the other hand, was Asian and civilized and therefore needed to be Turkified.
The Islamic Golden Age, then, was not appropriated for religious reasons, but rather
because it  was a  period of  Asian civilizational  greatness – one,  moreover,  that  was
recognized as such by European scholars.
3.4.2. The Rise of Europe
Tarih III, citing the French historian Edouard Driault, described the 16th century as the
“great century of the Turks.”284 During this century, according to the textbook, the states
controlled by the Turkish nation included the Ottoman Empire, the Mughal Empire and
the Golden Horde, whose combined geographical extent was greater than that of either
the  Umayyad  Caliphate  or  the  empire  of  Alexander  the  Great  had  been.  The  16th
century was claimed not only to mark a high point in the history of the Turks in terms of
military success and political greatness, but also in terms of wealth and civilizational
brilliance.285
Yet this period also witnessed the rise of Europe, which the textbook recounted in the
following way:
Between the middle of the 15th and the end of the 16th century, the last traces of
the Middle Ages gradually disappear in Europe, major changes take place,  the
horizon  expands,  important  steps  are  taken  toward  new  developments,  the
growing religious crisis has important effects. Military, geographical, economical,
philosophical, religious and political developments contribute to the beginning of
European early modernity.286 
These developments would,  in time, allow a number of European states to colonize
large parts of the world, in the process further increasing their own wealth and power,
and making Europe the “most important continent.”
284 “... Fransız müverrihi Driyo (Drieault) diyor ki: “XVI. asır, Türklerin büyük asrıdır ...”” Tarih III, 69.
285 “Vakıâ islâm tarihinde Türk devresinin gerek siyasî hasmet ve askerî azamet, gerekse servet ve medenî parlaklık 
itibarile en yüksek devresi XVI. asırdır.” Ibid., 69.
286 “XV. asrın ortalarından XVI. asrın sonlarına kadar ... Avrupada Ortazamanların son izleri yavaş yavaş silinir, 
büyük değişiklikler olur, ufuk genişler, yeni tekâmül yollarında ehemmiyetli adımlar atılır, dinî buhran inkişaf 
ederek mühim neticeler verir. Hulâsa askerî, coğrafî, iktisadî, fikrî, dinî, siyasî sahalarda tekâmüller vukua 
gelerek Avrupanın Yenizamanları ... hulûl eder.” Ibid., 80.
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The growing wealth and power of Europe was accompanied by the development of
European civilization. According to the textbook, this development had begun during
the late Middle Ages: “In the 12th and 13th centuries, civilization in Western Europe
began, after a long period of lagging behind the Eastern and Islamic world, to revive.”287
As in the case of ancient Greece and Rome, this civilizational development was shown
to  have  begun  through  the  influence  of  Eastern  learning.288 Yet  over  the  coming
centuries, European civilization would outgrow its Eastern roots. By the 17th century,
according to  Kemalist  historiography,  Western civilization  had surpassed its  Eastern
counterpart, even if the East was not yet ready to accept this.289 From the 17th century
onward, in a development which the textbook portrayed as mirroring the decline of the
Ottoman Empire, the world came increasingly to be dominated by Europe and European
civilization.
3.5. The Ottoman Empire
Where in Tarih I and II, the history of the Turkish nation was shown to encompass all of
Asian  history,  in  Tarih  III the  focus  narrowed.  The  majority  of  this  textbook  was
dedicated to an account of Ottoman history; other Asian states only received a passing
mention. In Kemalist historiography as expressed in the Tarih textbooks, the history of
the Turkish nation in the age of European ascendancy was thus almost exclusively tied
to the history of the Ottoman Empire. The textbook divided Ottoman history into four
periods:  the  establishment  and  rise  of  the  Ottoman  state  (“Osmanlı  Devleti'nin
Kuruluşu”),  from  its  foundation  by  Osman  I  in  1299  until  the  conquest  of
Constantinople in 1453; the Ottoman golden age (“Osmanlı İmparatorluğu”) between
1453 and the death of Grand Vizier Sokollu Mehmet Paşa in 1579; the age of Ottoman
decline  (“İmparatorluğun  İnhitatı”)  from  1579  until  1792,290 and  the  age  of
287 “... on ikinci ve on üçüncü asırlarda Garbî Avrupada medeniyet, şark ve islâm âlemine nazaran uzun bir gerilik 
devresinden sora yeni bir canlanma göstermeğe başlar.” Ibid., 16.
288 “... müslüman âlemile vaki olan medenî temas fikir ve san'at faaliyetinin de uyanmasına sebep olmuştur ... 
Avrupada bu devirdeki her yenilik gibi darülfünun tesisi de ilk evvel Italya ve Fransada yani müslüman âlemile 
en çok temasta bulunan memleketlerde görülür.” Ibid., 17.
289 “Şarkın müslüman kavimleri, XVI. asırda medeniyetçe garba mütefevvik bulunduklarından, XVII. asırdan 
itibaren medeniyette tefevvukun garba geçtiğini kabul ve itiraf etmiyorlardı.” Ibid., 189.
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disintegration and collapse (“İmparatorluğun İnhilâli ve İnkırazı”) from 1792 until the
year 1919. 
This periodization roughly followed that used by late Ottoman historians of the Ottoman
Empire,  who  tended  to  divide  Ottoman  history  into  four  periods:  rise,  golden  age,
stagnation and decline.291 This reflects the fact that in many ways the Tarih III version of
Ottoman history was a fairly standard account, whose basic shape did not differ much
from that of accounts written by late Ottoman historians. According to those histories,
the Ottoman state had enjoyed a steady period of territorial expansion and civilizational
development from its foundation around 1300 until roughly the end of the 16th century,
based on the competence of its rulers, the strength of its armies and the efficiency of its
administration. Yet from the late 16th century onwards, a succession of weak rulers and
economic  crises,  the  corruption  and  degeneration  of  the  military  and  of  the
administrative  apparatus,  and various  prisings  among the  empire's  subjects  led  to  a
decline in Ottoman fortunes, which, helped along by increasing European intervention
in Ottoman affairs, gathered pace as time went on, and eventually led to the empire's
collapse.292 
Kemalist historiography adopted this basic outline, but modified it in accordance with
the  nationalist,  secular  and  Westernizing  exigencies  of  the  Kemalist  nation-building
project. In this version of Ottoman history, the greatness of the Turkish nation was the
main factor behind the rise and golden age of the Ottoman Empire. Yet as European
civilization and military strength came to surpass that of the Turkish East in the early
17th century, and as Europe began to use its superiority against the Ottoman Empire, the
empire's strength and civilization went into eclipse. In a world increasingly dominated
by Western civilization, the Ottoman state needed to Westernize in order to survive, yet
290 The choice of the year 1792 as marking the beginning of the final period of Ottoman decline is a strange one; 
usually this period is seen to start with the signing of the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca in 1774, which granted 
major Ottoman territories, as well as the protectorship of the empire's Christian Orthodox subjects to the Russian
Empire, and is generally seen to mark the beginning of the “Eastern Question” of how best to divide up the 
Ottoman Empire's territories among the Great Powers without upsetting the European balance of power. The 
choice of the year 1792 may be explained by the fact that the Tarih III authors, presumably basing themselves on
the periodization used in Hamit and Muhsin's 1924 work Türkiye Tarihi, defined the period 1792-1839 as the 
“age of reforms,” but then included this period within the broader period of disintegration and collapse. For 
Hamit and Muhsin's Türkiye Tarihi, see Ersanlı, İktidar ve Tarih, 100-102.
291 Ersanlı, “The Ottoman Empire in the Historiography of the Kemalist Era,” 124.
292 Donald Quataert, “Ottoman History Writing and Changing Attitudes Toward the Notion of “Decline,”” History 
Compass 1 (2003), 1-2.
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failed to  do so mainly due to  the obscurantist  influence of Islam. Matters were not
helped by the multinational composition of the empire, which prevented the Turkish
nation from exercizing its natural leadership role, and which, following the emergence
of nationalism as a political force, inevitably led to the Ottoman Empire's disintegration.
Here, the textbook authors' depiction of the Ottoman golden age, and of what they saw
as the three main factors behind Ottoman decline – European intervention, the failure to
Westernize,  and the empire's  multi-national  composition – will  be analyzed in  more
detail.
3.5.1. The Ottoman Golden Age
The textbook account of the rise and golden age of the Ottoman state was not very
different from earlier accounts. Where it did deviate from many prior accounts was in
the emphasis which the narrative placed on the fact that the rise of the Ottoman state to
greatness was determined by its Turkish nature. Thus, the textbook narrative stressed the
fact that the Ottoman state was founded by Turks around the year 1300,293 and that its
organization and administration were similar to those of the other post-Seljuk Anatolian
Turkish  states.294 Following  its  foundation,  the  Ottoman  state  expanded  rapidly,  a
process only briefly interrupted by Timur's invasion of Anatolia and the defeat of the
Ottoman army under  Bayezid I  in  the  Battle  of  Ankara in  1402,295 and  in  1453 an
Ottoman  army led  by  Mehmed  II  conquered  Constantinople,  an  event  which  Türk
Tarihin Ana Hatları  presented as a victory for the Turkish nation over all of Europe:
“The conquest of Istanbul by the Turks was at the same time a defeat for all of Europe
and Christianity at the hands of the Ottoman Empire.”296
Further conquests under Mehmed II, Selim I and Süleyman over the following century
proved the continuing military prowess  of  the  empire,  and made it,  by the time of
293 “Osmanlı Devletini tesis eden ve soradan Osmanlı namını alan Türkler ...” Tarih III, 1.
294 Ibid., 4-6.
295 Interestingly, the Tarih II texbook does not favour either side in its account of this battle, portraying Bayezid and 
Timur as Turkish lords of equal stature. Tarih II, 324-327.
296 “İstanbul'un Türkler tarafından fethi, aynı zamanda bütün Avrupa'nın ve Hristiyan âleminin o vakit, Osmanlı 
İmparatorluğu tarafından mağlubiyeti demekti.” Türk Tarihin Ana Hatları, 392.
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Süleyman,  “one  of  the  world's  largest  states.”297 Yet  according to  the  textbook,  the
Ottoman Empire was not only notable for its size. The state was also extremely wealthy,
superior to the West in manufacturing and trade,298 tolerant and just towards both its
Muslim  and  non-Muslim  subjects,299 and  run  by  an  administration  that  no  less  an
authority than Niccolò Machiavelli had described as the best in the world.300
The  empire's  power  was  matched  by  its  civilization  –  dubbed  “Ottoman-Turkish
culture”301 – which supposedly reached a high point during the reign of Mehmed II. This
expressed itself in material culture and architecture, as well as in the realms of literature
and philosophy.302 The textbook also emphasized the fact that, reflecting the Turkish
nation's commitment to scientific progress, the empire's  medreses in this period taught
not  only religious  subjects,  but  also  physics,  astronomy,  zoology,  and  other  natural
sciences.303 “Ottoman-Turkish” civilization was shown to reach a  second high point
during the reign of Süleyman.304 This was evidenced, in particular, by the architectural
masterpieces  created  by  Mimar  Sinan,  after  whom Ottoman  architecture  “began  to
decline in terms of simplicity, solidity, magnificence and splendour,”305 and the poetry
of Bâkî and of Fuzulî, whom, the authors proudly noted, the British orientalist H.A.R.
Gibb had described as one of the world's great lyric poets.306 
As this brief overview has illustrated, the first 250 years of the Ottoman state and of
Ottoman civilization were clearly Turkified in the textbook account. Yet as the Ottoman
realm supposedly began to exhibit the first signs of decadence and decline during the
297 “... Sultan Süleyman zamanında ... Osmanlı İmparatorluğu dünyanın en büyük devletlerinden biri [idi].' Ibid., 52.
298 'Zaten XVI. asırda şarkın sanayi ve ziraati garptan üstündü.” Ibid.,53.
299 “İstanbulun fetih üzerine, Türklerin şöhreti Avrupanın her tarafına yayıldı. Türklerin ellerine geçen memleketleri
çok adalet ve merhametle idare ettikleri, fıkarayı zenginlerin gadir ve tazyikından kurtardıkları şayi olmuştu; 
Türk tebaası olan kavimlerin refah ve saadete erdikleri söyleniyordu.” Ibid., 40.
300 “ ... Makyavelli bile, Türk idaresinin o zamanlarda mevcut idarelerin hepsinden daha eyi olduğunu yazıyordu.” 
Ibid., 40.
301 “... Osmanlı-Türk harsı ...” Ibid., 41.
302 Ibid., 41-42.
303 Ibid., 42.
304 “... Kanunî Süleyman zamanı, Osmanlı Türklerinin hars itibarile de en mütekâmil bir devridir.” Ibid., 57.
305 “... bundan itibaren Osmanlı mimarısı sadelik, salâbet, azamet ve ihtişam cihetile düşmeye başlar.” Ibid., 58. The
textbook does not claim that Sinan was Turkish, noting merely that he was from the central Anatolian city of 
Kayseri. In this way, the problem of Sinan's non-Muslim origins is fudged. See Gürpınar, Ottoman/Turkish 
Visions of the Nation, 49.
306 “... İngiliz müşteşriki Mister Gip, Fuzulîyi, bütün dünyanın en büyük lirik şairlerinden saymaktadır.” Ibid., 59.
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later  years  of  Süleyman's  reign,307 the  authors  began  to  gradually  disassociate  the
Turkish nation from the fortunes of the Ottoman Empire, a process that will be analyzed
in more detail in the following sections.
3.5.2. Factors Behind Ottoman Decline I: European Intervention
Tarih  III  portrayed  European  wars  against  the  Ottoman  Empire  and  European
interventions  in  the  empire's  internal  affairs  as  having  played  a  major  part  in  the
empire's  economic  decline  and   gradual  territorial  disintegration.  In  line  with  the
Kemalist  historians'  conception  of  two opposed  civilizational  blocks  in  Europe  and
Asia, European wars against the Ottoman Empire were shown to be part of a general
European counterattack against the Turkish-dominated East.308 This counterattack had
supposedly begun in the late 15th cenury, with Christopher Columbus' attempt to find
an alternative route to India – part of a cunning European plan to attack the Turkish
world from behind309 –  and the subjection of the Central Asian Golden Horde to the
lords  of  Rus.310 Yet  it  was  not  until  the  late  17th  century that  the  Europeans  were
sufficiently strong, and the Ottomans sufficiently weak, for the European armies to be
consistently successful in the campaigns against the Ottoman Empire itself.311
The textbook characterized the early European campaigns against the Ottoman Empire
as  religiously motivated.  Thus the Christian  campaigns against  the  Ottomans which
ended in decisive Ottoman victories at the 1396 Battle of Nicopolis312 and the 1444
Battle of Varna313 were described as “crusades,” as were the anti-Ottoman campaigns of
307 “Hasılı, Kanunî Süleyman devrinde zirvesine eren Osmanlı saltanatında, muvaffakiyet, servet ve refahtan doğan 
inhitat ve inkıraz emareleri de görülmeye başlamıştı.” Ibid., 61.
308 “... Türklerin tevessüü ve medeniyeti sekte ve tevakkufa uğramış ve XVII. asırdan itibaren ricat ve inhitat 
başlamıştır. Türklerde, tevessü hareketi durur durmaz, hıristiyan Avrupalılar mukabil taarruza geçtiler.” Ibid., 
69.
309 “1495 [sic] te Amerikayı keşfeden ve insaniyete, medeniyete hizmet kastile hareket ettiğini zanneylediğimiz 
Kristof Kolomp, Garptan giderek Hinde vâsil olmak ve bu suretle Türk-islâm âlemini arkadan vurmak istiyordu.”
Ibid., 70.
310 “İlk büyük ricat ve inhilâl bugünkü Rusyada sakin Türkler arasında vukua geldi. Hâkim olan Altınordu hanları, 
mahkûm mevkiine, mâhkum olan Rus beyleri, hâkim mevkiine geçtiler.” Ibid., 69.
311 “... Osmanlı-Türkleri bir asır kadar mukavemet edebilmişler (XVII. asır); fakat sora, daha ilerde göreceğimiz 
veçhile, onlar da ricate icbar edilmişlerdir.” Ibid., 70.
312 Ibid., 20-21.
313 Ibid., 30-31.
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the Holy Leagues of 1571314 and 1684.315 Perhaps reflecting the authors' assertion that in
the aftermath of the Renaissance and of the Protestant Reformation religion had begun
to  lose  its  influence  over  European  politics,316 the  religious  aspect  faded  into  the
background in the textbooks' account of later European-Ottoman wars. Thus the 18th-
century Russian and Austrian wars against the empire were shown to be predominantly
motivated by profane considerations, particularly the Russian desire to have access to
the  Mediterranean Sea,  and the  Austrian  Habsburg  emperors'  endeavour  to  seize  as
many  Ottoman  possessions  in  the  Balkans  as  possible  for  themselves.317 European
interactions – both military and diplomatic – with the empire in the 19th and early 20th
centuries, meanwhile,  were shown to be guided by the conflicting exigencies of the
European colonial enterprise and of the “Eastern Question.” Following the industrial
revolution,  a  number  of  European  powers  thus  supposedly  decided  to  reduce  the
Ottoman Empire to the status of a semi-colony which would supply them with raw
materials and serve as a market for their manufactured goods.318 At the same time, the
European powers were shown to profit from the Ottoman Empire's continuing weakness
by gradually carving up the empire's remaining territories. The 1878 Treaty of Berlin, in
which the empire lost most of its remaining European territories, was portrayed as a
direct  precursor  of  the  1920  Treay  of  Sèvres,  the  “final”  division  of  the  Ottoman
Empire.319
What is striking about this account of the European role in the decline and disintegration
of the Ottoman Empire is its neutral tone. In marked contrast to earlier polemics against
314 Ibid., 65
315 “Bu müttefikler heyetine ... “İttifakı Mukaddes” namı verilmişti; Türkler aleyhine yürüyen ordu, tam bir Haçlılar
ordusu idi.” Ibid., 147. The Holy League of 1571 was an alliance of almost all Catholic Mediterranean powers, 
organized by Pope Pius V and aiming to end Ottoman control of the Eastern Mediterranean. The League won a 
crushing victory over the Ottoman fleet at the Battle of Lepanto in 1571. The Holy League of 1684, meanwhile, 
was an alliance of the Holy Roman Empire, Poland-Lithuania, Venice and Russia, which was 
organized by Pope Innocent XI, and whose various campaigns against the Ottoman Empire would 
lead to the signing of the Treaty of Karlowitz in 1699, a treaty which enshrined the first major 
territorial losses of the Ottoman Empire.
316 “... protestanlık reformasiyonu Ortazamanların emperyalizm ve teokrasisine kat'î olarak nihayet vermiştir.” Ibid.,
103.
317 Ibid., 143-144.
318 “... Fransa ve İngiltere ve bunları müteakıp sanayileşen Avusturya ve Prusya Osmanlı memleketlerinin, Osmanlı 
Hükûmeti idaresi altında kalarak, kendilerine ham eşya hazırlıyan ve kendilerinin mamulâtını satın alan bir 
ticaret sahası, bir istismar mıntıkası halinde yaşamasını menfaatlerine muvafık buluyorlardı.” Ibid., 241.
319 This continuity is clearly expressed through the terminology used to describe these treaties: the Treaty of Berlin 
is referred to as “Osmanlı Devletinin Parçalanması,” (Tarih III, 259), and the Sèvres Treaty as “Osmanlı 
Devletinin Son Parçalanması.” (Tarih III, 309).
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European intervention penned by Turkish nationalists in the late Ottoman period, in the
textbooks we find very little condemnation of European aggression. This contrast may
be illustrated by comparing the textbook's account of the Italian invasion of Ottoman
Libya  in  1911  to  the  portrayal  of  the  same  event  in  the  Turkish  nationalist  Ömer
Seyfettin's 1911 short story Primo: Türk Çocuğu. Where the textbook lapidarily noted
that the Italians, “accepting the crisis of the Ottoman state as an opportunity, set out to
occupy Tripoli,”320 Seyfettin's reaction was considerably more outraged: “In the middle
of the twentieth century,  when – so one hoped – the rights of individuals, societies,
states and nations had become clearly defined, how could this piratical assault have
been expected? What a vile crime this was...”321
The  difference  between  these  two  accounts  may  be  explained  by the  fact  that  the
Kemalist historians, unlike Turkish nationalists of the late Ottoman era, did not closely
identify with the Ottoman state. In the Turkish Republic, they had their own state – one,
moreover, that had been created by abolishing the Ottoman dynasty. This is not to say
that the textbook completely disowned the Ottoman past: as we have seen, the rise and
golden age of the Ottoman Empire were largely attributed to the efforts of the Turkish
nation. Yet as the narrative moved forward into the age of Ottoman decline, references
to the empire's Turkish nature became less and less frequent. The final disassociation of
the Turkish nation from the Ottoman empire was clearly expressed in  the  Tarih III
account of the signing of the Treaty of Sèvres: “Fortunately,  the Turkish nation, the
rulers and most important element of this country, paid no heed to the Ottoman sultan's
signature [of the Sèvres Treaty]. The sultan who sent his delegates to Sèvres had no kind
of  command  or  power  over  “Turkey.””322 It  is  thus  possible  to  speak  of  a  partial
Turkification  of  Ottoman  history  in  Kemalist  historiography,  whereby  the  Turkish
nation was associated with the early periods of Ottoman greatness, but not with the later
periods of decline and disintegration.323 The neutral depiction of the European wars of
320 “Osmanlı Devletinin buhranını [İtalya] da fırsat ittihaz ederek Trablusgarba ... işgale teşebbüs etti.” Tarih III, 
301.
321 Ömer Seyfettin, “Primo Türk Çocuğu,” in Ömer Seyfettin, Bütün Eserleri: Hikâyeler 1, ed. Hülya Argunşah 
(Istanbul: Dergâh Yayınları, 1999), 167. Translation my own.
322 “Bereket versin ki Osmanlı Sultanının imzasına, bu memleketin hâkimi ve esas unsuru olan Türk Milleti hiçbir 
kıymet vermiyordu; Sevre murahhaslar gönderen Sultanın “Türkiye” üzerinde hiçbir hüküm ve nüfuzu yoktu.” 
Tarih III, 310.
323 See also Gürpınar, Ottoman/Turkish Visions of the Nation, 45-58, for an extensive discussion of this point. 
69
aggression against  an empire  that  was no longer  Turkish can be understood in  this
context.
The textbook's neutral approach to these European interventions may also be ascribed to
the fact that the authors viewed European colonialism as a natural result of the European
powers'  scientific,  military  and  economic  ascendancy  over  the  rest  of  the  world:
“During the 19th century, the European states began to expand into the territories of
nations  that  were  scientifically  and  economically  backward.”324 Europe  had
civilizationally overtaken the rest of the world, and this  to an extent legitimized the
colonial expansion of the European powers, just as the earlier civilizational superiority
of the Turks had legitimized their expansion across Eurasia. If the Ottoman Empire did
not  want  to  fall  victim to  European colonialism,  it  had  to  catch  up  with  European
civilization; it had to Westernize. In failing to do so, it had only itself to blame for its
subjugation at the hands of the Europeans. This brings us to the textbook's depiction of
the empire's failure to Westernize, which will be covered in the next section.
3.5.3. Factors Behind Ottoman Decline II: Failure to Westernize
As  we  have  seen,  the  Kemalist  historians  perceived  Western  civilization  to  have
overtaken the civilization of the East early in  the 17th century.  This  meant  that  the
Ottoman  Empire had to adopt at least some aspects of Western civilization if it was to
survive in a world increasingly shaped by that civilization: “From the 17th century, it
became imperative for the East to start adopting Western sciences.”325
In this context, the textbook repeatedly cited the case of Russia as an example which the
Ottoman Empire should have emulated.326 The Westernization of Russia had begun, so
the textbook authors claimed, in the early 17th century under the first Romanov tsar,
and  had  involved  inviting  European  merchants  to  Russia,  sending  ambassadors  to
324 “XIX. asırda ... Avrupa devletleri ... ilmen, iktisaden geri kalmış olan milletler elindeki memleketlere yayılmağa 
başladılar.” Tarih III, 287.
325 “... artik [XVII. asırda] şarkın garp ulûmundan istifadesi zarureti hasıl olmuştu.” Tarih III, 120.
326 The choice of Russian Westernization as a comparative standard is interesting. Thus Palmira Brummet, in her 
analysis of political cartoons from the Second Constitutional Era of the Ottoman Empire, has noted that Russia 
was seen as, “in part, a reflection of the Ottoman self.” Palmira Brummett, Image and Imperialism in the 
Ottoman Revolutionary Press, 1908-1911 (Albany: SUNY Press, 2000), 165.
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European capitals, granting women greater access to public life, and offering patronage
to artists.327 Supposedly building on these earlier reforms, Peter the Great in the early
18th century embarked on a more extensive Westernization program: 
Peter wanted to reform the state of Muscovy, which until his reign had been ruled
through  the  institutions  and  protocol  inherited  from the  Turkish  khans  of  the
Golden Horde and from the Byzantine Empire, and to adopt a European system.
Annihilating the Streltsy, who were similar to the Janissaries, with great violence,
he established European-style regiments in their place and trained and equipped
them according to European standards. He aimed not only to reform the structure
of the state, but also the lifestyle of the people, forcing them to abandon the old
dress of Muscovy. Peter succeeded in reforming the Russian people's religious
institutions, the style of education (the first secular schools were opened in this
time), and the structure of society.328
These  reforms,  so  the  textbooks,  allowed  the  Russian  state  to  escape  the  Eastern
civilizational block it had been a part of, and to become a fully fledged and flourishing
member of Western civilization.329
Compared to the supposed alacrity of the Russian state in adopting Western civilization,
Ottoman  Westernization  was  shown  to  be  late,  placing  the  empire  at  a  growing
disadvantage vis-a-vis the Europeans: “The Ottoman state's reluctance to profit from
Western civilization – and be it solely through imitation – meant that the state's power
declined even more dramatically.”330 The textbook did speak approvingly of the military
reforms eventually enacted by Selim III and Mahmud II in the early 19th century, and of
327 'Romanof Hanedanının, iktidar mevkiine geçmesile Rusyada karışıklık devri nihayet bulur, mühim bir
tekâmül devresi başlar ... garplılaşmanın zarureti anlaşılmıştı. Rusyaya ecnebi tacirler çağrıldı ... 
Avrupanın muhtelif merkezlerine sefaret heyetleri gönderildi. Kadın kapalı ve mütecerrit vaziyetten 
çıkarılmak, güzel san'atlere mevki verilmek istendi.' Tarih III, 127-128. In actual fact, Russian 
Westernization did not begin until the reign of Peter the Great in the early 18th century, but by 
backdating the reforms by a century the textbook authors were able to underline the alacrity with 
which the Russians supposedly adopted Western civilization, and the comparative sluggishness of the
Ottomans in doing the same.
328 “Petroya kadar, Altınordu Türk Hanlarının ve Bizans imparatorlarının teşkilât ve teşrifatile idare olunan Moskof
Devletini, bu Çar, Avrupa usulünde tanzim ve idare etmek istemiş, ve Yeniçerilere benziyen Strelits askerini 
büyük bir şiddetle imha edip, yerine Avrupa usulünde alaylar tesis ve bunları Avrupa harp san'atine uygun bir 
tarzda talim ve terbiye ve teçhiz ettirmiştir ... Bunlardan maada, eski Moskof âdetlerini, eski Moskof kisve ve 
kıyafetlerini de zorla değiştirerek yalnız devlet idaresini değil, halkın maişet usullerini de tebdile çalışmıştır; 
Petro, ahalinin dinî müesseselerinde, tedris usullerinde (ilk laik mektepler o zaman açılmıştır) ve içtimaî 
teşkilâtında dahi hayli değişiklikler yapmağı muvaffak olmuştur.” Tarih III, 142.
329 “... Moskova Çarlığı, XVIII. asır başında şark medeniyetinden sıyrılarak garp medeniyet havzasına girmek için 
çok uğraşmış ve bundan da müstefit olmuştu; kuvvetli bir Rusya İmparatorluğu teşekkül etmişti.” Ibid., 148.
330 “ ... garbın medeniyetinden velev taklit suretile olsun, istifadeye şitap etmemek, Osmanlı Devletinin daha ziyade 
kuvvetten düşmesini intaç edecekti.” Ibid., 147-148.
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the  Tanzimat  reforms  that  followed  them,  which  were  portrayed  as  a  fairly
comprehensive overhaul  of the Ottoman state.331 Yet these reforms,  so the textbook,
were a failure because – unlike the reforms embarked on by Peter the Great – they failed
to  fundamentally  change  the  “soul  or  worldview”  of  the  people.332 Successful
Westernization would only be achieved through the radical social reforms initiated by
the Turkish government in the 1920s.
The textbook authors placed much of the blame for what they saw as the late and partial
nature of Ottoman Westernization on the dominant role of Islam in Ottoman state and
society. The extent to which Islam was associated with “Eastern backwardness” in the
minds of the Kemalist historians becomes clear in their account of the reign of Mehmed
II's  successor  Bayezid  II,  described as  the Ottoman state's  “first  period of  religious
reaction:”333
During the reign of Mehmed II, the Ottoman state had faced west. In the palace
and residences of the Ottoman sultan, a free, art-loving and splendid lifestyle had
flourished,  far  from any  religious  fanaticism.  During  the  time  of  Bayezid,  a
political  and social  reaction becomes evident.  A religious scholar from Aleppo
nicknamed  “the  Arab  Mullah,”  having  been  appointed  to  the  office  of
Şeyhülislam, incited this opium-addled ruler down the road of religion, dervishry
and fanaticism. Western and local artists were chased from the palace; engraving,
paintings and sculptures were removed from the palace and sold in the central
market. The influence of scholars and sheikhs from the East increased. In short, in
Ottoman  culture  and  politics,  the  reign  of  Bayezid  II  witnessed  a  time  of
reaction.334
The Ottoman Empire was able to recover from this period of religious reaction and
experience a second civilizational flowering during the reign of Süleyman. But Islam,
331 “Tanzimat Devrinde, Osmanlı Devletinin idare şekli, Avrupa devletlerinin idare tarzlarına hayli benzetildi. 
Dahiliye, hariciye, adliye, maarif ve sair nazırlıklar ihdas olundu ... Avrupa payıtahtlarına daimî elçiler 
gönderilerek devletlerle fasılasız diplomasi münasebatına girişildi. Asker, Avrupa usulile tanzim ve talim olundu;
Avrupa modeline göre mahkemeler yapıldı ... medreseler teşkilâtı ipka olunmakla beraber yeni usulde mektepler 
açılmağa başlandı.” Ibid., 248
332 “ ... “Tanzimat” muvaffakıyetsizliğe uğradı. Devletin şekli haricisi hayli Avrupalılaşmakla beraber, halkın ruh ve
nazarları pek değişmedi.” Ibid., 249
333 “Osmanlı Devleti'nde İlk Gericilik: II. Bayazıt” Ibid., 44
334 “Fatih devrinde Osmanlı Devletinin gözü garba bakıyordu ... Osmanlı saray ve konaklarında taassuptan uzak, 
serbest, san'at seven ve debdebeli bir hayat başlamıştı. Bayazıt zamanında siyaset ve hayatta bir aksülâmel, bir 
irtica görülmektedir ... O sıralarda Şeyhülislâmlığa tayin olunan Halepli bir hoca, “Molla Arap”... bu afyona 
müptelâ hükümdarı, ... zahitlik, dervişlik ve dinî taassup yoluna sevketmişlerdir ... Sarayda bulunan yerli ve 
Avrupalı san'atkârlara yol verildi; levhalar, tasvirler, heykeller saraydan çıkarılıp, çarşı pazarda sattırıldı ... 
Şarktan gelme âlim ve şeyhlerin sarayda itibarı arttı ... Hasılı Bayazıt II. zamanında, Osmanlı Devletinin hars ve
siyasetinde bir irtica meşhuttur.” Ibid., 44-45
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according to the textbooks, would continue to frustrate Ottoman reformers and prevent
the  Ottoman  Empire  from moving  towards  Western  civilization.  Thus,  the  authors
blamed the 1808 rebellion of the Janissaries against Selim III's military reforms on the
provocations of the ulema and of the Şeyhülislam,335 and voiced a damning indictment
of Islam as a reactionary force:
In Europe after the Renaissance, religious fanaticism had collapsed to a certain
extent, and there had been a concerted effort to found social and political life on
the positive sciences; in the fields of science and art, Europe had progressed year
by year. In the Ottoman realm, on the other hand, even in the beginning of the
19th century ignorance and religious fanaticism blocked any attempts at renewal
and  progress.  This  led  to  a  decline  in  the  social  and political  life  of  Muslim
Ottomans.336
While Selim III's successor Mahmud II, according to the textbook, attempted to limit
the power of the religious elite in the course of his centralizing reforms in the early
19th century, he was not entirely successful.337 Like the complete Westernization of
state  and  society,  complete  secularization  would  only  be  achieved  through  the
reforms of the Turkish Republic.
3.5.4. Factors Behind Ottoman Decline III: The Empire's Multinational Character
In  addition  to  European  interventions,  the  empire's  failure  to  Westernize  and  the
dominant role of Islam, the Kemalist historians also portrayed the Ottoman Empire's
multi-national composition as a main reason for its decline and eventual disintegration.
One aspect of this problem was the supposedly undue influence of non-Muslims and
non-Turks in the running of the Ottoman state. In this context, the authors highlighted
two cases in particular: the so-called “women's sultanate” (kadınlar saltanatı)  during
335 “Kabakçıoğlunun kıyamında, halkı en çok teşvik eden ulema sınıfı idi; kıyamı, şeyhülislâm ile sadrazam 
kaymakamı idare ettiler.” Ibid., 196
336 “Avrupada, Rönesans Devrinden (XV. asır) beri, taassup bir dereceye kadar yıkıldığından, içtimaî ve siyasî 
hayatı, müspet ilimler üzerine kurmaya çalışılıyordu; Avrupa yıldan yıla ilim ve san'at sahalarında ilerliyordu. 
Halbuki Osmanlı ülkesinde XIX. asrın başlarında bile cehil ve taassup her türlü yeniliğe ve ilerlemeğe  ... 
manialar ihdas ediyordu. Bu hal, tabiatile müslüman Osmanlı içtimaî ve siyasî hayatının gerilemesine sebep 
oluyordu.” Ibid., 197.
337 “Mahmut II. ulema ile de uğraşmış ve nüfuzlarını kesre hayli çalışmış ise de tamamen muvaffak olamamıştır.” 
Ibid., 207.
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the  late  16th  and  early  17th  centuries,  and  the  golden  age  of  the  Greek  Orthodox
Phanariot families in the 18th century. 
The “women's sultanate” was a period lasting from the final years of Süleyman's reign
until the mid-17th century,  during which various wives, mothers and consorts of the
Ottoman sultans enjoyed an unprecedented degree of influence in the running of the
state. Coinciding as it did with a period of economic, political and social disruption in
the Ottoman realm, it is perhaps not surprising that a number of (male) contemporary
Ottoman and foreign commentators blamed the greater influence of these royal women
for the problems afflicting the empire, a point also taken up by later historians.338 The
Kemalist  historians  adopted  this  point,  but  added  a  nationalist  dimension  to  it  by
stressing the non-Turkish origins of these women:
The  ineffectiveness  and  immorality  of  the  sultans  who  succeeded  Süleyman
opened the way to palace intrigues and the tyranny of the palace women. The
most important of the women to gain power and rule the sultanate in this way
were Süleyman's  favourite,  the  Russian Hürrem Sultan,  as  well  as  Murat  III's
wife, the Venetian Safiye, and especially Ahmed I's favourite, the Greek Kösem
Sultan. Kösem, who dominated the reign of six sultans, did not even shy away
from toppling her own son from the throne and having him executed, or from
attempting to poison her grandson, in order to perpetuate her rule.339 
In this  way, the empire's decline following its “Turkish” golden age was tied to the
pernicious influence of these non-Turkish and, at least originally, non-Muslim women at
the very heart of Ottoman power.
If the textbook authors placed much of the blame for the empire's decline in the late
16th and 17th centuries on the dominant position of foreign women in the Ottoman
state, the continuing travails of the state throughout the 18th century were blamed on the
Phanariots, a mercantile Greek Orthodox community from the Fener district of Istanbul
which,  through its  hold on the  positions  of  grand dragoman (chief  translator  to  the
Ottoman porte) and  voyvoda (chief administrator)  of the provinces of Wallachia and
338 Leslie Peirce, “Shifting Boundaries: Images of Ottoman Royal Women in the 16th and 17th Centuries,” Critical 
Matrix 4 (1988), 69-70.
339 “Kanunî Süleymandan sora padişahların şahsen kabiliyetsiz ve ahlâksız olmaları, saray entrikalarına ve saray 
kadınlarının tahakkümüne yol açmıştır ... Bu suretle nüfuz kazanmış ve saltanat sürmüş olan saray kadınlarının 
başlıcaları Kanunî Süleymanın ... gözdesi Rus Hurrem Sultan ile Murat III. ün zevcesi Venedikli Safiye (Bafo) ve 
bilhassa Ahmet I. in hasekisi Rum Kösem Sultan idi. Altı padişah devrini idrak eden Kösem, hakimiyetini idame 
için oğlunu hali ve idamdan, torununu, zehirletmiye teşebbüsten bile çekinmemiştir.” Tarih III, 118.
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Moldavia, gained considerable influence during this period.340 According to the Tarih III
account, the Phanariot lords almost completely controlled the Ottoman administration
during the 18th century,341 and this had a deleterious effect on the functioning of the
Ottoman state. Equally motivated by greed and a desire to avenge the annihilation of the
Byzantine  Empire  at  the  hands  of  the  Ottomans,  these  “cast-offs  of  the  Byzantine
Empire”342 supposedly did their utmost to keep the empire economically and militarily
weak, and to prevent any meaningful attempts at reform.343
In  this  context  it  is  interesting  that,  in  contrast  to  other  Turkish  nationalists  of  the
time,344 the textbook authors took a fairly positive view of the  devşirme, the “levy of
boys” imposed on the Christian population of the empire's Balkan provinces by which
the Ottoman state took young boys from their families and, having made them convert
to Islam, trained them to serve as soldiers in the Janissary corps or as bureaucrats in the
administration.  There are two possible explanations for the positive portrayal of this
practice of bringing non-Turks into key positions in the Ottoman state. One is that the
main period of the devşirme levy lasted from the mid-15th to the early 17th century, and
thus coincided roughly with the Ottoman golden age. A second explanation is that the
Kemalist historians were intent on refuting Balkan nationalist accounts, which presented
the practice as a “blood tax” and as the epitome of Ottoman cruelty towards the empire's
Christian subjects.345 Not at all, the textbook authors insisted: “As the Christian boys
who joined the Janissaries or entered the palace service were able to gradually rise to
the highest offices and thus to positively affect the lives of their families, the Christian
subjects began to offer their sons to the devşirme of their own volition.”346
340 Christine M. Philliou, Biography of an Empire: Governing Ottomans in an Age of Revolution (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2010), 10-11.
341 “Biraz mubalâğa ile denilebilir ki XVIII. asırda Rum patrikhanesi ile Fenerli beyler, bütün Osmanlı idaresini 
kontrol etmek ve bu idarede sözlerini geçirmek iktidarını elde etmişlerdi.” Tarih III, 199.
342 “... Bizans döküntüleri ...” Ibid., 198.
343 Ibid., 199.
344 Büşra Ersanlı, “The Ottoman Empire in the Historiography of the Kemalist Era,” 138.
345 Fikret Adanır, “Güneydoğu Avrupa'daki Tarih Ders Kitaplarında Osmanlı İdaresi İmgesi: Gelenekler ve Yeni 
Yaklaşımlar,” in Tarih Eğitimi ve Tarihte “Öteki” Sorunu, ed. Ali Berktay et al. (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt 
Yayınları, 1998), 144-145.
346 “Yeniçeriliğe giren, devşirmelikten saraya alınan hıristiyan çocuklar, gitgide en büyük makamlara kadar 
yükselebildiklerinden ve bunların vaziyeti yakınlarının ahvaline çok eyi tesirler yaptığından, hıristiyan ahali 
çocuklarını kendi rıza ve ricalarile devşirme ocağına vermeğe başlamıştı.” Tarih III, 23.
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For the Kemalist historians, an even greater problem than the high positions achieved by
various non-Turks in the Ottoman state was the multiethnic and multireligious make-up
of the empire's population, particularly in the Balkan provinces. The textbook authors –
in another apparent effort to counter the negative depiction of early Ottoman rule in the
nationalist historiography of various post-Ottoman Balkan states – stressed the fact that,
during the empire's early centuries, Ottoman rule over the Balkan provinces had been
characterized by a high degree of tolerance, peace and a low tax burden on the local
population.  As  a  result,  the  Balkan  peasants  were  happy  to  accept  Ottoman
overlordship, preferring it to the rapacious and arbitrary rule of their own lords.347 The
subsequent decline of the Ottoman Empire, however, also supposedly had a negative
effect on Ottoman rule over these provinces, as provincial administrators increased the
tax burden and began fighting amongst themselves, and as the region was repeatedly
ravaged in  the  wars  between the  empire  and its  northern  neighbours.  The resulting
dissatisfaction of the local population, combined with the adoption of the nationalist
ideals of the French revolution by local intellectuals, led to the emergence, from the
early 19th century onward, of nationalist separatist movements in a number of Balkan
provinces.348 
The textbook account of the emergence of the Balkan nationalist movements and of
their  efforts  to  create  their  own nation-states  separate  from the  Ottoman  empire  is
suprisingly neutral. This is probably due to the fact that the textbook authors, despite the
traumatic experience of the Balkan wars, felt a certain amount of sympathy for these
movements' aims. Like the Turkish nationalist movement which many of the textbook
authors  had  been  a  part  of,  the  Balkan  nationalist  movements  were  grounded  in
“national principles,” and as such their cause was worthy of acknowledgment, if not
approbation.
According to the textbook authors, once the world had entered the age of nationalism,
and once  national  movements  had begun to  form among  the  empire's  subjects,  the
Ottoman Empire was doomed. This doom could not be averted by introducing legal
347 “Balkanlardaki hıristiyan köylüler, Türk idaresi altında, vasileus ve kırallar zamanından çok daha mes'ut ve 
müreffeh bir hayata kavuştular.” Ibid., 36.
348 Ibid., 197-198.
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equality for all  of the empire's  subjects  (as  was done through the 1856 Rescript  of
Reform), nor by instituting limited popular representation (between 1876 and 1878, and
again from 1908 until the self-dissolution of the Ottoman parliament in 1920), nor by
attempting  to  foster  a  kind  of  civic  nationalism  based  on  the  Ottoman  state.  The
textbook authors were critical of these efforts to save the Ottoman Empire in the face of
the rising nationalist tide, portraying them as naive and idealistic. This criticism was
most  clearly  expressed  in  the  description  of  the  aims  of  the  19th-century  Young
Ottoman movement, which had been among the key advocates of such reforms:
As the ideas of European civilization began to slowly spread among Ottoman
Muslim intellectuals,  a  few young, talented and educated Ottoman bureaucrats
came to believe, based on  their reading of French books, that if only the Ottoman
Empire  could  be  placed  on  a  constitutional  footing,  and  if  the  principles  of
freedom and equality were accepted and a parliament was founded, the Greeks
would forget their Greekness, the Bulgarians their Bulgarianness, the Serbs their
Serbness, and all would become Ottomans. They hoped that the effects of liberty
and constitutionalism would end corruption,  religious and national hatreds and
conflicts, and create a well-ruled, happy and prosperous “Ottoman nation.” Most
of these young men were idealists and some of them poets; yet they had no real
understanding  of  economic,  financial  and  political  matters,  and  they  most
certainly never understood the national principle.349
The Kemalist historians claimed that their criticism of the Young Ottoman's ideals had
been borne out by developments during the Second Constitutional Era, when even the
previously loyal Muslim subjects of the empire, despite being given full political rights,
began to  turn  against  it.350 In  the  face  of  the  primordial  force  of  nationalism,  they
reasoned, any attempt to save the Ottoman Empire was a lost cause.
349 “Avrupa medeniyeti fikirlerinin Müslüman Osmanlı münevverleri arasında az çok yayılması üzerine, Osmanlı 
yüksek memurlarının fransızca kitap okumıya heves eden bazı müstait ve yetişmiş çocukları, devlet idaresi ... 
meşrutî bir şekle konul[ursa ve] ... [h]ürriyet ve müsavat esasları kabul olunur ve bir meclisi meb'usan teşkil 
edilirse, Rum, rumluğunu, Bulgar, bulgarlığını, Sırp, sırplığını unutup Osmanlı olacak zannediyorlardı. Hürriyet
ve meşrutiyetin tesiri ile suiistimaller, dinî ve millî münaferet ve mücadeleler, hepsi ortadan kalkıp mükemmel 
idare olunan mes'ut ve müreffeh bir “Osmanlı Milleti” teşekkül eder ... ümidinde bulunuyorlardı. Bu gençlerin 
çoğu idealist ve bir kısmı şair ... idi; fakat iktisadî, malî ve idarî meseleler hakkında ciddî malûmatları yoktu. 
Hele milliyet esaslarını asla anlıyamamışlardı.” Ibid., 254-255. 
350 “Görülüyor ki İmparatorlukta ikinci defa meşrutiyetin ilânile bütün tebaaya siyasî hukuk verilmiş olmasına 
rağmen ... meşrutiyet devrine kadar millî iddiaları az olan müslüman gayritürkler dahi milliyete müstenit istiklâl
davasına girişmişler ve hatta filî hareketlere bile geçmişlerdi.” Tarih III, 303.
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3.5.5. Coda: The Turkish Nation Resurgent
According to the textbook authors, the Turkish nation had, for all its many contributions
to  the  Ottoman  state  and  to  Ottoman  civilization,  maintained  a  separate  identity
throughout the history of the Ottoman Empire: “The real mass of the Turkish nation
never accepted Ottomanism. As a matter of fact, the people of Anatolia only referred to
the palace and its coterie as Ottoman, and always saw themselves as separate.”351 Along
with its separate identity, the Turkish nation had also preserved the characteristics that
had made it  such a  great civilizational  force throughout history.  Thus,  the  Tarih III
textbook noted that a chickenpox vaccine was used in Anatolian villages in the 17th
century, long before it was introduced in Europe, and went on to claim that “Even at a
time when Ottoman culture was inferior to European culture in every area, there were
still some important events that proved the superiority of age-old Turkish civilization,
preserved in the deepest layers of the Turkish folk, to [that of] Europe.”352
Yet the civilizational potential of the Turkish nation had for centuries been submerged
under the dead weight of a corrupt and weak state and of Islam, and diluted by the
cosmopolitanism  of  Ottoman  society.  If  the  Turkish  nation  wanted  to  regain  the
civilizational leadership role it had held throughout history, it would have to get rid of
these  obstacles  to  its  development.  This  became  possible  after  the  victory  of  the
Anatolian forces in the National Struggle, portrayed as a reclamation of sovereignty by
the Turkish nation after 300 years.353 This victory allowed the Turkish nation to rid itself
of the Ottoman sultanate after centuries of misrule,354 to abolish the caliphate and other
religious  institutions  that  had  sunk the  nation  into  apathy and  ignorance,355 and,  in
accordance with the “natural,  necessary and ungovernable exigencies of history,”  as
351 “ ... Türk Milletinin aslî kütlesi osmanlılık vasfını üzerine almamıştır. Hakikaten Anadolu halkı herzaman yalnız 
sarayla onun etrafında toplanmış zümreye Osmanlı demiş ve kendini daima onun dışında tutmuştur.” Tarih IV, 
183.
352 “Osmanlı harsının bu suretle Avrupa harsına karşı, her sahada yenilerek gerilemekte olduğu bir zamanda bile, 
çok kadîm, halkın en derin tabakalarına kadar girmiş Türk medeniliğinin Avrupaya tefevvukunu gösteren bazı 
mühim vak'alar malûmdur.” Tarih III, 149.
353 “Türk Milleti, bu kat'î zafer sayesinde, üç asırdır kaybettiği siyasî ve iktisadî istiklâlini istirdat edecek ...” Tarih 
IV, 121.
354 “Türk milleti ... [a]sırlarca kendini fena idare ve istismar ederek inkırazını hazırlıyan saltanat ve hilâfet 
sistemine nihayet ver[di].” Ibid., 57.
355 Ibid., 157.
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Mustafa  Kemal  put  it  in  1927,356 to  establish  a  Turkish  nation  state  in  the  Turkish
national homeland. As a result of these changes, the Turkish nation was able to finally
take its place as a full member of modern, Western civilization.
356 ““... tarihin tabiî, zarurî ve önüne geçilmez icapları ...”” Quoted in Tarih IV, 146.
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CONCLUSION
In  this  thesis,  I  have  argued  that  the  Turkish  national  history  found  in  the  Tarih
textbooks  was  the  product  of  three  main  groups  of  factors.  These  groups  may  be
categorized  as,  respectively,  pragmatic,  ideological  and  historiographical.  On  a
pragmatic level, the new national history had to fulfill a number of functions. First of
all, it was supposed to legitimize the abolition of the Ottoman Empire and its attendant
institutions – most notably the Caliphate – and the empire's replacement by the Turkish
Republic. Secondly, the new historical narrative aimed to legitimize the claim of the
Turkish Republic to the territory it had been granted by the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923.
Thirdly, it aimed to provide a historical basis for the Turkish state's attempts to mould
its Muslim citizens into a cohesive, Turkish-speaking nation. Fourthly,  the textbooks
aimed  to  counter  Western  claims  about  the  Turks'  supposed  barbarity  and  lack  of
civilization. Finally, the Tarih narrative had to historically legitimize the attempts of the
Turkish state to Westernize and secularize Turkish society and culture.
Beyond  these  pragmatic  aims,  the  textbook  narrative  also  reflected  the  ideological
convictions  of  the  Turkish  republican  political  elite  of  the  early  1930s,  which
underpinned the project of nation-building and reform embarked on by the Turkish state
in this period. First among these convictions was a strong sense of Turkish nationalism.
This  included  both  a  belief  in  the  historical  greatness  and  distinct  character  of  the
Turkish nation, and the conviction that the nation-state, in which the national and the
political  unit  were congruent,  was the most  modern and advanced form of political
community.  Secondly,  the  Tarih  narrative also reflected the scientistic  beliefs  of  the
republic's  political  elite.  These  expressed  themselves  in  the  textbooks'  depiction  of
science  as  the  engine  of  human  progress,  and,  conversely,  of  religion  as  the  main
obstacle to human advancement throughout history.  Thirdly, the history found in the
textbooks was also clearly shaped by the Kemalist historians' belief in the civilizational
superiority of  the modern West,  and the concomitant  conviction that  the world was
divided into distinct Eastern and Western spheres.
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The Turkish history we find in the Tarih textbooks needs also to be understood in the
light of various narratives of Turkish history that had been developed in the decades
prior to the writing of the textbooks. Thus, the textbook history shared a number of
important characteristics with the Turkist historical narrative, most crucially in its focus
on  the  pre-Islamic  Central  Asian  origins  and  the  civilized/civilizing  nature  of  the
Turkish  nation.  Of  particular  importance  in  this  context  are  the  influence  of  Leon
Cahun, whose  theory of an ancient Turkish nation living around a Central Asian inland
sea the texbooks adopted, along with Necip Asim's focus on the antiquity and civilizing
role of the Turkish nation and Ziya Gökalp's characterization of Turkish national culture
as feminist and expressing an “international morality.” Along with these various strands
of the Turkist historical narrative, the textbooks also drew on the pioneering work of
Fuad Köprülü on the pre-Ottoman Turkification of Anatolia under the Seljuks, while
also adopting the claim, first made by Mustafa Celâleddin Paşa  in the 19th century and
reprised by Ahmed Ağaoğlu in the 1920s, that the ancient Hittites had belonged to the
Turkish nation.
All  of  these  factors  combined  to  create  the  elaborate  history of  the  Turkish  nation
presented in the Tarih textbooks. The creation of a narrative of the past that showed the
Muslim inhabitants of Anatolia to be members of a single, Turkish nation provided a
historical foundation for the Turkish state's nation-building efforts. At the same time, the
creation of a historical link between the originally Central  Asian Turkish nation and
Anatolia – first through the Hittites and then through the Seljuks – legitimized the claim
of  the  Turkish  Republic  (as  the  Turkish  nation  state)  to  the  territory  it  controlled,
trumping the rival claims of Greeks and Armenians in the process.
The textbook depiction  of  the  Turkish nation  as  the  founders  of  world  civilization,
meanwhile,  countered  Western  assertions  about  the  supposed  barbarism  and
civilizational incapacity of the Turkish nation. This was further reinforced by depicting
the pre-16th century civilizational superiority of the Asian East to the European West as
a result of the dominant role played by the Turkish nation in the history of Asia. By
showing the civilization created by the Turkish nation to carry many of the hallmarks of
Western modernity – secularism, a positivist approach to knowledge, equality between
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the  sexes  –  the  Tarih  textbooks  also  created  a  historical  legitimization  for  the
Westernizing and secularizing reforms of the Turkish state, showing these reforms to be
restitutive rather than revolutionary in nature.
Finally,  the  textbooks  placed  the  blame  for  the  Turkish  nation's  contemporary
backwardness vis-a-vis the West squarely on the shoulders of the Ottoman Empire. Both
the stifling influence of Islam and the multinational nature of the empire, they argued,
had prevented the Turkish nation from keeping up with the civilizational advances made
by the West from the late 16th century onward, and had in fact caused it to fall further
and further behind the West. This depiction of the Ottoman past as a kind of Dark Age
in the history of the Turkish nation legitimized the abolition of the Ottoman Empire and
its  replacement  by the national,  secular  Turkish Republic,  which – according to the
textbooks  –  would  allow  the  Turkish  nation  to  return  to  the  vanguard  of  world
civilization.
In both its temporal and geographical scope, the historical narrative found in the Tarih
textbooks was  undoubtedly  unusual  –  a  result  of  the  myriad  different  factors  that
informed its creation. On another level, however, the Kemalist historical narrative may
also be seen as a typical example of how modern states use a particular narrative of the
past in order to legitimize their rule,357 mould their subjects into a coherent social and
political  unit,  and give  that  unit  a  particular  shape.358 In  this  context,  a  potentially
fruitful avenue of future enquiry might be the comparison of Kemalist historiography to
the histories created by other modern states. On the basis of the themes covered in this
thesis,  two  approaches  in  particular  suggest  themselves.  The  first  of  these  is  a
comparison of the depiction of the imperial  past  in the historiographies of Kemalist
Turkey and other modern post-imperial successor states. A second, different approach
might compare the historiography of the Kemalist state to those developed by other
non-Western  states  which  had embarked  on  radical  programs  of  modernization  and
Westernization in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, focusing in particular on how
these  states  used  history  in  order  to  legitimize  their  respective  projects  of
357 Eric Hobsbawm, “Mass-Producing Traditions: Europe, 1870-1914,” in The Invention of Tradition, ed. Eric 
Hobsbawm et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 263-264. 
358 Ibid., 271.
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modernization. Both of these comparisons might contribute to a deeper understanding of
these two particular aspects of the Kemalist historical narrative.
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